The "contradiction" which Locke could not see was clearly seen and keenly felt by Leibnitz. The arbitrary will of God, to him, was no solution. He believed in necessary truths independent of the Supreme Will; in other words, he believed that the Supreme Will is but the organ of the Supreme Reason: "Il ne faut point s'imaginer, que les vérités éternelles, étant dépendantes de Dieu, sont arbitragés et dépendent de sa volonté." He felt, with Des Cartes, the incompatibility of thought with extension, considered as an immanent quality of substance, and he shared with Spinoza the unific propensity which distinguishes the higher order of philosophic minds. Dualism was an offence to him. On the other hand, he differed from Spinoza in his vivid sense of individuality, of personality. The pantheistic idea of a single, sole being, of which all other beings are mere modalities, was also and equally an offence to him. He saw well the illusoriness and unfruitfulness of such a universe as Spinoza dreamed. He saw it to be a vain imagination, a dream-world, "without form and void," nowhere blossoming into reality. The philosophy of Leibnitz is equally remote from that of Des Cartes on the one hand, and from that of Spinoza on the other. He diverges from the former on the question of substance, which Des Cartes conceived as consisting of two kinds, one active (thinking) and one passive (extended), but which Leibnitz conceives to be all and only active. He explodes Dualism, and resolves the antithesis of matter and spirit by positing extension as a continuous act instead of a passive mode, substance as an active force instead of an inert mass,--matter as substance appearing, communicating,--as the necessary band and relation of spirits among themselves. [19] [Footnote 19: The following passages may serve as illustrations of these positions:-- "Materia habet de so actum entitativum."--_De Princip. Indiv_. Coroll. I. "Dicam interim notionem virium seu virtutis, (quam Germani vocant _Kraft_, Galli, _la force_,) cui ego explicandae peculiarem Dynamices scientiam destinavi, plurimum lucis afferre ad veram notionem substantiae intelligendam."--_De Primae Philosoph. Emendat, et de Notione Substantiae_. "Corpus ergo est agens extensum; dici poterit esse substantiam extensam, modo teneatur omnem substantiam _agere, at omne agens substantiam_ appellari." "Patebit non tantum mentes, sed etiam substantiae omnes in loco, non nisi per _operationem_ esse."-- _De Vera Method. Phil. et Theol_. "Extensionem concipere ut absolutum ex eo forte oritur quod spatium concipimus per modum substantiae"--_Ad Des Bosses Ep_. XXIX. "Car l'étendue ne signifie qu'une répétition ou multiplicité continuée de ce qui est répandu."--_Extrait d'une Lettre_, etc. "Et l'on peut dire que Pétunduc est en quelque façon à l'espace comme la durée est au tems."--_Exam. des Principes de Malebranche_.