He differs from Locke, furthermore, on the question of the origin of ideas. This question, he says, "is not a preliminary one in philosophy, and one must have made great progress to be able to grapple successfully with it."--"Meanwhile, I think I may say, that our ideas, even those of sensible objects, _viennent de nôtre propre fond_... I am by no means for the _tabula rasa_ of Aristotle; on the contrary, there is to me something rational (_quelque chose de solide_) in what Plato called _reminiscence_. Nay, more than that, we have not only a reminiscence of all our past thoughts, but we have also a _presentiment_ of all our thoughts." [21] [Footnote 21: _Reflexions sur l'Essai de l'Entendement humain_.] Mr. Lewes, in his "Biographical History of Philosophy," speaks of the essay from which these words are quoted, as written in "a somewhat supercilious tone." We are unable to detect any such feature in it. That trait was wholly foreign from Leibnitz's nature. "Car je suis des plus dociles," he says of himself, in this same essay. He was the most tolerant of philosophers. "Je ne méprise presque rien."--"Nemo est ingenio minus quam ego censorio."-- "Mirum dictu: probo pleraque quae lego."--"Non admodum refutationes quaerere aut legere soleo." To return to the monads. Each monad, according to Leibnitz, is, properly speaking, a soul, inasmuch as each is endowed with perception. But in order to distinguish those which have only perception from those which have also sentiment and memory, he will call the latter _souls_, the former _monads_ or _entelechies_. [22] [Footnote 22: _Entelechy_ ([Greek: entelechia]) is an Aristotelian term, signifying activity, or more properly perhaps, self action. Leibnitz understands by it something complete in itself ([Greek: echon to enteles]). Mr. Butler, in his _History of Ancient Philosophy_, lately reprinted in this country, translates it "act." _Function_, we think would be a better rendering. (See W. Archer Butler's _Lectures_, Last Series, Lect. 2.) Aristotle uses the word as a definition of the soul. "The soul," he says, "is the first entelechy of an active body."]