_Taking the Formation for Combat._—The units of the second line should take their combat formation from the parallel of departure and from there be oriented on a well fixed objective; in fact, they risk coming unexpectedly under fire and should be ready for it at any time. There is, moreover, a reason of a moral order for it, which has been very often tested out. When taking the formation for combat, that is to say, when getting ready to fight the enemy before even having seen him, it seems that each one becomes imbued with a cold and silent resolution, which is alone irresistible. Taking formation under the pressure of danger, however, seems more like a check, and there comes out of it a demoralizing sensation of sudden fear and disorder. _Formation._—The conditions which the formation should fulfil are the following: to be supple in order to adapt itself immediately to the exigencies of the situation; to be as invulnerable as possible so that it may escape the effects of a sudden destructive fire. For a company, the formation seems to be that of two lines about 150 metres apart, the skirmishers three or four paces apart, the company commander marching between the two lines so that he can see what the first line sees without being entirely involved in its combat. The march has been generally conducted in small columns at deploying intervals, as it seems that this formation is the more supple and permits of a better utilization of the terrain. This is true only in time of peace, but in war one must deploy a long time before the bullets arrive. _March and Use of Ground._—Each company marches _at a walk_ straight toward its objective and _in line_ as long as it is not subjected to direct fire; it thus avoids the irregularities which arise from the anxiety to make use of the ground, when from now on, only one anxiety should prevail, that of routing the enemy. There is generally a tendency to try to make use of the hostile _boyaux_ and trenches as lines of advance. Even if they should permit approach by surprise and without loss, they divide up the company and break the formations for attack; furthermore an extraordinary difficulty is experienced in leaving them when the bullets whistle and the moment comes for getting out on the open field. I shall always remember Fonquevillers, where I persisted in following with my company a narrow approach which brought me near the enemy, and I know that we had much trouble in leaving it. I have often thought since that it would have been preferable to take a combat position in a hollow road a little further to the rear parallel to the enemy’s front, at 400 metres. _Combat of Units of the Second Line._—The units of the first line, having made their effort, have been finally stopped on the whole front by a series of resistances. The troops of the second line have received as their mission only the two following objects: To master a well-defined zone up to a certain point;