Governor Fajardo affords an example of a successful military man who, having won fame for himself in the wars of the continent, but without legal knowledge or administrative experience, was called to the government of a distant and isolated colony, with the responsibility of continuing in harmonious relations with a hostile civil and judicial tribunal on the one hand, with whose powers and functions he was not familiar, and an equally hostile religious institution on the other. Men of military training usually had great contempt for the abilities and good intentions of priests and lawyers in those days, and it was frequently evident, both by their actions and by their own confessions, that conquistadores of the stamp of Fajardo, Acuña, and Corcuera were little fitted for the exercise of administrative and governmental functions, however useful they might be in adding to the domain of the Spanish empire. Thus, there being present in the colony a tribunal of trained lawyers who were at the same time capable and experienced administrators, the governors became accustomed to rely on them for advice and assistance, in compliance with the commands of the laws of the Indies. As one governor of military tastes and training succeeded another, each lacking administrative ability and experience, the audiencia came to assume an increased share in the governmental activity of the colony. This tendency was accentuated by the fact that the governor was absent from the capital city on campaigns of conquest and defense a large share of his time. Ability as a soldier and commander was always the chief criterion for the selection of a governor and captain-general, and military affairs were given more attention by far than matters of administration. Spain's policy of selecting soldiers instead of administrators for the post of governor went far towards making the audiencia more than a court of justice, and towards giving it a share in the executive functions of government. This tendency was also furthered by the fact that the audiencia came to assume the entire administration on the death or absence of the governor, a power which it did not always exercise well, but which it always relinquished with reluctance. The Salcedo affair in 1668-1670 emphasizes other differences than those of the audiencia and the governor, yet reference should be made to it in this connection, because, after all, the oidores were concerned indirectly in the struggle. An examination of the data at our command will reveal the fact that the refusal or failure of the oidores to intervene in behalf of the governor led to his defeat and humiliation by the commissary of the Inquisition. The audiencia might have prevented that disaster had the magistrates been so inclined.