well together; indeed great, far-reaching crimes are only possible from their union. Similarly, "unreasonable" and "noble-minded" are often found associated; _e.g._, if I give to-day to the needy man what I shall myself require to-morrow more urgently than he; or, if I am so far affected as to hand over to one in distress the sum which my creditor is waiting for; and such cases could be multiplied indefinitely. We have seen that this exaltation of Reason to be the source of all virtue rests on two assertions. First, as =Practical Reason=, it is said to issue, like an oracle, peremptory Imperatives purely _a priori._ Secondly, taken in connection with the false explanation of =Theoretical Reason=, as given in the _Kritik der Reinen Vernunft_, it is presented as a certain faculty essentially concerned with the =Unconditioned=, as manifested in three alleged Ideas[17] (the impossibility of which the intellect at the same time recognises _a priori_). And we found that this position, as an _exemplar vitiis imitabile_,[18] led our muddy-headed philosophers, Jacobi at their head, from bad to worse. They talked of =Reason= (_Vernunft_) as directly comprehending (_vernehmend_) the "=Supersensuous=," and absurdly declared that it is a certain mental property which has to do essentially with things transcending all experience, _i.e._, with metaphysics; and that it perceives directly and intuitively the ultimate causes of all things, and of all Being, the Supersensuous, the Absolute, the Divine, etc. Now, had it been wished to use Reason, instead of deifying it, such assertions as these must long ago have been met by the simple remark that, if man, by virtue of a special organ, furnished by his Reason, for solving the riddle of the world, possessed an innate metaphysics that only required development; in that case there would have to be just as complete agreement on metaphysical matters as on the truths of arithmetic and geometry; and this would make it totally impossible that there should exist on the earth a large number of radically different religions, and a still larger number of radically different systems of philosophy. Indeed, we may rather suppose that, if any one were found to differ from the rest in his religious or philosophical views, he would be at once regarded as a subject for mental pathology. Nor would the following plain reflection have failed to present itself. If we discovered a species of apes which intentionally prepared instruments for fighting, or building, or for any other purpose; we should immediately admit that it was endowed with Reason. On the other hand, if we meet with savages destitute of all metaphysics, or of all religion (and there are such); it does not occur to us to deny them Reason on that account. The Reason that =proves= its pretended supersensuous knowledge was duly brought back to bounds by Kant's critique; but Jacobi's wonderful Reason, that directly =comprehends= the supersensuous,