The Basis of Social Relations: A Study in Ethnic PsychologyBrinton, Daniel G. (Daniel Garrison)
Science
The Basis of Social Relations: A Study in Ethnic Psychology
Brinton, Daniel G. (Daniel Garrison)
Ethnopsychology; Sociology
What, then, is man’s proud prerogative? What the gift which has given
him the world and all that therein is? The answer is in one
word,—_ideation_. The last efforts of modern science can but paraphrase
the words which the philosopher Locke penned nigh two centuries ago:
“The having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction
between man and brute.” The latest American writer on the subject merely
repeats this when he phrases it “the ability to think in general terms
by using symbols (words) which summarise systems of association.”
Let us avoid the metaphysical snares which have been spread around this
simple statement. No matter about such words as “concepts,” “notions,”
“apperceptions,” “abstractions,” and the like. Let us fix in mind the
formula of Romanes: “Distinctively human faculty belongs with
distinctively human ideation.” This, the power to form general
ideas,—which are necessarily abstract,—is the one prerogative which
lifts man above brute. By it he can compare what he learns and thus
develop an intellectual life for comparison; to borrow the metaphor of a
famous student of his kind, it is the magic wand, the diamond-hilted
sword, by which man will conquer his salvation through learning the
truth. We exclaim, with Pascal, “It is Thought which makes Man.”
Outside of this and its developments, all that man has of soul-life is
in common with the brute. Why should he be ashamed of it? What folly to
pretend, as the common phrase goes, to “get rid of the brute in man”!
Parental love, social instincts, fidelity, friendship, courage,—these
are parts of his heritage from his four-footed ancestor. What would he
become, dispossessed of them?
Already, in that long alienation from his brethren which made man the
one species of his genus and the one genus of his class, has he lost
certain strange powers of mind which excite our special wonder when we
see their manifestations in his remote relations. The chief of these is
Instinct. We are all familiar with its extraordinary exhibitions in
bees, ants, and higher animals, and its seeming total absence in
ourselves. What can we make of it?
_Instinct and Intelligence._—Throughout all nature there is an unceasing
eternal conflict between the old and the new, between motion and rest,
between the fixed and the variable, between the individual and the
universe. This cosmic contest is reflected within the realm of animal
life in the contrast between Instinct and Intelligence.
Instinct is hereditary; it belongs to the species; its performance is
unconscious, resulting from internal impulse; its tendency is endless
repetition, not improvement; it is petrified, inherited habit.
Intelligence belongs to the individual; it is neither inherited nor
transmissible by blood; its tendency is toward advancement, progress. It
is the source of all knowledge not purely empirical, and of all
development not of chance.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account