Vietnam War, 1961-1975 -- Campaigns -- Vietnam -- Khe Sanh
If there was anything that could top that performance, it was the
spectacular air shows provided daily by B-52 Stratofortresses of the
4133d Provisional Heavy Bombardment Wing, based at Andersen Air Force
Base, Guam, and the 4258th Strategic Bombardment Wing in Thailand. The
B-52 pilots did not count on finesse as much as they did on sheer power
because each Stratofortress carried a 27-ton payload of 108 mixed 500-
and 750-pound bombs. Since these giants had the means to virtually
move mountains, the Arc Light strikes were used on area targets such
as troop concentrations, marshalling points, supply depots, and bunker
sites. The result of the enemy build-up around the base was an enormous
number of targets located in dispersed but common areas and such
complexes were ideal for heavy bombers. These targets were programmed
into computers aboard the aircraft and the strikes were conducted from
altitudes above 30,000 feet. To the bomber crews, it was an impersonal
type of warfare because, from above the overcast, they rarely even saw
their bombs explode. The bombs did not have to be seen to be felt.(143)
When several flights of B-52s worked over a target, the results
were awesome. The exploding bombs churned up strips of the terrain
several thousand meters long and the ground for miles around literally
shook from the blasts. Many enemy casualties were sustained from the
concussion alone. One entry from a captured North Vietnamese diary
read: "18 February: The heavy bombing of the jets and B-52 explosions
are so strong that our lungs hurt." In some instances, NVA soldiers
were found after an Arc Light strike wandering around in a daze with
blood streaming from their noses and mouths.[52] Often the internal
hemorrhaging induced by the concussion was so severe that it resulted
in death. Quite understandably, such missions could not be unleashed
too close to the Marines.(144)
In the early stages of the conflict, Arc Light strikes were not
authorized within a prescribed distance of friendly lines. The same
rule had applied during the heavy fighting at Con Thien the year before
and the NVA had taken advantage of the buffer zone by moving troops and
supplies in as close to the Marine base as possible to avoid the bomber
raids. They tried the same thing at Khe Sanh. When American airborne
observers noted enemy bunker complexes cropping up near the KSCB, the
no-bomb line was moved in to about half of the original distance. At
first the regimental commander was afraid that the resulting concussion
would collapse his own bunkers and trenches; as it turned out, the
enemy fortifications were the only ones which suffered. The first
few B-52 raids inside the old line touched off scores of secondary
explosions and undoubtedly snapped the North Vietnamese out of their
sense of security. The closer strikes also served as a morale booster
for the defenders who flocked from their bunkers to watch, what the
Marines called, "Number One on the hit parade."(145)
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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