Before advancing it was absolutely essential to place in Nashville a large supply of rations, ammunition, etc., sufficient to support the army during the longest probable break in the railway, as a result of the forays of the rebel cavalry. This required an entire month, and the administration was greatly dissatisfied at the long delay. Rosecrans went through an experience very similar to that suffered by Thomas at the same place later in the war. But to the threats to relieve him he made the blunt reply that if confidence did not exist he was perfectly ready to turn over the command and abide by the issue. Halleck then explained that it was not intended to threaten him, but that there was great anxiety in Washington over the slow course of events in Tennessee. He explained that this arose from diplomatic reasons. It had been greatly desired that a decided advantage be gained over the rebels before the opening of the British Parliament, otherwise the advocates of intervention in favor of the Confederacy would be able to point to the possession of Tennessee as a proof that the South was gaining on the North. It would seem, however, that this was only one of the long series of attempts by Halleck to run the war from an office in Washington--a course that never did and never could result in any good. Rosecrans continued his preparations carefully, and Bragg concluded that he was going into winter quarters at Nashville. Bragg therefore placed his army in winter quarters at Murfreesboro' and vicinity, and detached his cavalry for operations in West Tennessee and against the railway in Kentucky. This was just what Rosecrans wanted. He wanted Bragg to draw near to Nashville so that his own line of communications might be short and a reverse less disastrous. Rosecrans was also anxious that the rebel cavalry should be distant when he advanced, as his army was very deficient in cavalry.