Word had been sent to Rosecrans soon after seven o'clock that McCook's corps was heavily pressed and needed assistance. But he did not realize the extent of the disaster, and it was not until informed by a second messenger that the right wing was being driven that he realized the true state of affairs. He found then that he must abandon his plan and take every means to prevent the terrible disaster that seemed imminent. He directed the movement on the left to be suspended and placed Rousseau's division in the cedar brakes to the right and rear of Sheridan. As soon as it became plain, from the great amount of fugitives, that McCook's wing was routed, Van Cleve's division was placed on the right of Rousseau's, and a brigade of Wood's division to its right. Negley's and Sheridan's divisions fell back upon this new line. Upon this line the rebels made four distinct attacks, but were repulsed with very heavy losses. The fighting was almost hand to hand, and the losses on both sides were heavy. That of the regular brigade was especially severe, being 637 out of a total of 1,566. The new line succeeded in holding its ground and driving back the enemy from its front. The left had also had severe fighting, becoming gradually engaged as Bragg's turning movement went on. As the change of front went on the left became more important until when the final line was formed, close to the Nashville turnpike, the left became the vital point, since a disaster there would have permitted the line to be enfiladed and the stragglers would have carried any resulting disorder along the whole line. During the afternoon Breckenridge made several heavy assaults on Palmer's division, but was repulsed. Rosecrans succeeded in placing his troops in rather a strong line near the road, and the subsequent assaults of the enemy were repelled. The army slept in the position, spare ammunition was issued and found to be sufficient for another battle. The left was withdrawn slightly to more advantageous ground, and Rosecrans determined to await the attack of the enemy in his new lines, but if Bragg did not attack to do so himself. During the morning of the 1st of January the rebels made repeated attempts to advance on Thomas's front, but were repulsed. During the afternoon the enemy massed a large number of troops in front of the right but did not attack. Bragg's object was evidently to feel the Union lines and find out if Rosecrans was retreating. Satisfied that he was not, he felt himself unable to attack in view of the heavy hammering his army had received the day before. Rosecrans passed Van Cleve's division across the stream and occupied some hills which threatened Polk's lines in enfilade. Next day Bragg tried to drive back Van Cleve's division, which was commanded by Colonel Beatty. The movement failed after severe fighting. During the night Bragg massed his force on his former right and Rosecrans greatly strengthened his left.