With the exception of the _Emden_, who operated with success in the Bay of Bengal, and the _Karlsruhe_, whose area of operations was along the junction of the South Atlantic and the West Indian trade routes, none of them succeeded in accomplishing a fraction of the damage that might reasonably have been expected at a time when our merchantmen were not organised for war and business was "as usual." It cannot be denied that the _Emden's_ raids wholly disorganised the trade along the east coast of India. The local moneylenders--who are the bankers to the peasants--abandoned the coast completely, trade nearly came to a standstill, and the damage done took months to recover. In this case the effects could by no means be measured by an armchair calculation of the tonnage sunk by the _Emden_ in pounds, shillings and pence. The main anxiety of the German Admiral lay in the continuance of his supplies, which could only be assured by careful organisation. This was rendered comparatively easy in South America, where every port teemed with Germans; the wheels of communication, through the agency of shore wireless stations, were well oiled by German money, and there were numerous German merchantmen, fitted with wireless, ready to hand to be used as supply ships or colliers. It was thus of paramount importance that the German Squadron should be rounded up and annihilated before it could become a serious menace to our trade and that of our Allies. The other remaining light cruisers of the enemy, who were operating singly, could be dealt with more easily, since our ships could afford to separate in order to search for them, thus rendering it only a matter of time before they were destroyed. What was the object, then, of the German Admiral? This was the all-important question that occupied the thoughts of all our naval officers in foreign parts. On the assumption that he would come eastwards, there appeared to be few choices open to him beyond the following: (1) To bombard the seaports of our colonies on the west coast of Africa and to attack weakly defended but by no means valueless naval stations (such as St. Helena), at the same time operating against British and French expeditions going by sea against German colonies. (2) To go to South Africa, destroy the weak British squadron at the Cape, and hang up Botha's expedition by supporting a rising against us in the South African Dominions. (3) To endeavour to make his way home to Germany. (4) To operate in the North Atlantic. (5) To harass our trade with South America.