The Battle of the Falkland Islands, Before and AfterSpencer-Cooper, Henry Edmund Harvey
History
The Battle of the Falkland Islands, Before and After
Spencer-Cooper, Henry Edmund Harvey
Falkland Islands, Battle of the, 1914; World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations
For the better understanding of the movements which follow, it may be
stated that the ideal of a naval artillerist is a good target--that
is, a clear and well defined object which is plainly visible through
the telescopic gunsights; the wind in the right direction, relative
to the engaged side, so that smoke does not blow across the guns,
and no sudden alterations of course, to throw out calculations.
The tactics of a modern naval action are in a large measure based
on these ideals, at any rate according to the view of the gunnery
specialist.
It is evident that it was Admiral Cradock's intention to close in
and force action at short range as quickly as possible, in order
that the enemy might be handicapped by the rays of the lowering sun,
which would have been behind our ships, rendering them a very poor
target for the Germans as the squadrons drew abeam of one another.
He therefore altered course inwards towards the enemy, but von Spee
was either too wary or too wise, for he says in his report that he
turned away to a southerly course after 5.35, thus declining action,
which the superior speed of his squadron enabled him to do at his
pleasure. The wind was south (right ahead), and it was blowing very
fresh, so that a heavy head sea was encountered, which made all
ships--especially the light-cruisers--pitch and roll considerably. It
seems very doubtful whether the _Good Hope_ and _Monmouth_ were able
to use their main deck guns, and it is certain that they could not
have been of any value. This would mean that these two ships could
only fire two 9.2-inch and ten 6-inch guns on the broadside between
them, instead of their whole armament of two 9.2-inch and seventeen
6-inch guns.
[Illustration: DIAGRAM II 6.40 p.m.]
There was little daylight left when Admiral Cradock tried to close
the Germans, hoping that they would accept his challenge in view of
their superior strength.
At 6.18 Admiral Cradock increased speed to 17 knots, making a
wireless message to the _Canopus_, "I am about to attack enemy now."
Both squadrons were now on parallel courses approximately, steering
south, and about 7½ miles apart. A second light cruiser joined the
German line about this period; according to von Spee's report the
_Scharnhorst_ was leading, followed by the _Gneisenau_, _Leipzig_,
and _Dresden_.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account