hoping in the interval to get more information which might lead to a further stroke of good fortune. The threat of the _Australia_ and the Japanese squadron to the north was not sufficiently pronounced to force him to hurry. We have seen that it was almost out of the question for von Spee to maintain his ships in the Northern Pacific, but the conditions were entirely different on the west coast of South America. Here there were a number of uninhabited anchorages where he could shelter, and he had a large German population to help him on the coast of Chile. In fact, he did maintain himself here until he knew that hostile forces were concentrating and would move south to drive him out. Meanwhile, he had effected repairs to his ships, and had completed arrangements in advance for the supplies of his ships on the east coast of South America. Thus the conclusion appeared to be that there was no alternative open to von Spee but to leave the Pacific, where he had already shot his bolt. Whatever the true explanation of his policy may be, the movements of his squadron point to his having been quite at a loss what to do next. His position was so hazardous and uncertain, so full of future difficulties, that he could not see his way clear for any length of time in order to work out any concerted plan. He was a fugitive pure and simple, and felt that whatever he did was in the nature of a venture. It was not till Cradock was defeated that he appears to have formulated his plan for attacking the Falkland Islands. He then seems to have been carried away by the effect that the temporary capture of a British colony and the hoisting of the German flag would have on our prestige throughout the world. He would have destroyed the wireless station, seized the coal and provisions lying there, and would then have had to abandon the colony to subsequent recapture. Had he originally contemplated such a dramatic coup, he would never have delayed a moment longer than was necessary. Keeping well away from the usual trade routes, the German ships sailed south, and on the way were lucky enough to meet the _North Wales_, one of Cradock's colliers. They arrived at San Quintin Sound on November 21st, coaled, and stayed five days. Thence von Spee kept out for 200 miles from the land before turning south, and got into very rough weather. An officer in the _Gneisenau_ states: "_November 27th_--Force of wind up to 12. Later the weather moderated a little so that we could proceed at 8 knots. "_November 29th_--Impossible to lay the tables. Broken up furniture thrown overboard. All crockery was smashed. Impossible to be on deck. Necessary to secure oneself with ropes. We are about off the entrance to the Magellan Straits. "_December 2nd_--Sighted two icebergs, appear to be 50 metres high. "_December 3rd_--We are lying at the eastern exit of the Beagle Channel close to Picton Island. "_December 6th_--We are going to Port Stanley."