Dislocation of the plan, however, was not all. In the attempts to carry the fortress of Liége by storm the Germans lost, out of the three corps forming the army of General von Emmich, 48,700 men killed and wounded.[10] These corps, troops from Hanover, Pomerania, and Brandenburg, formed the flower of the army. The work had to be carried out of burying the dead and evacuating the wounded. The shattered corps had to be reformed from reserves. All this of necessity meant additional complications. Then there was the further fighting with the Belgians. What were the losses sustained by the Germans between the assaults on Liége and the occupation of Brussels is, outside of Germany, not known, nor is it known in Germany save to the Government. To put that loss as at least equal to the losses at Liége is, however, a very conservative estimate. Meanwhile, the French had advanced into Belgium along both banks of the Meuse and that further contributed to upset the great preparation. We have, therefore, down to August 21, losses, including those in the fighting on the Meuse and in Belgian Luxemburg, probably equal to the destruction of two reinforced army corps. Now we come to the Battle of Mons and Charleroi, when to the surprise of all non-German tacticians, the attacks in mass formation witnessed at Liége were repeated. To describe that battle is beyond the scope of this narrative. But it is certain that the estimates so far formed of German losses are below, if not a long way below, the truth. There is, however, a reliable comparative basis on which to arrive at a computation, and this has a most essential bearing on later events. At Liége there were three heavy mass attacks against trenches defended by a total force of 20,000 Belgian riflemen with machine guns.[11] We have seen what the losses were. At Mons, against the British forces, there were mass attacks against lines held by five divisions of British infantry, a total roughly of 65,000 riflemen, with machine guns, and backed by over sixty batteries of artillery. Now, taking them altogether, the British infantry reach, as marksmen, a level quite unknown in the armies of the Continent. Further, these mass attacks were made by the Germans with far greater numbers than at Liége, and there were far more of them. Indeed, they were pressed at frequent intervals during two days and part of the intervening night. The evidence as to the dense formations adopted in these attacks is conclusive.