[12] "At daybreak on the 24th (Aug.) the Second Division from the neighbourhood of Harmignies made a powerful demonstration as if to retake Binche. This was supported by the artillery of the first and second divisions, while the First Division took up a supporting position in the neighbourhood of Peissant. Under cover of this demonstration the Second (Army) Corps retired on the line Dour--Quarouble--Frameries."--_Despatch of Sir John French of September 7_. [13] The reported extraordinary Army Order issued by the German Emperor commanding "extermination" of the British force has since been officially disavowed as a fiction. CHAPTER III GENERAL JOFFRE AS A STRATEGIST From the strategy on the German side let us now turn to that on the side of the French. Between them a fundamental distinction at once appears. Of both the aim was similar--to compel the other side to fight under a disadvantage. In that way strategy helps to ensure victory, or to lessen the consequences of defeat. The strategy of the German General Staff, however, was from the outset obvious. The strategy of General Joffre was at the outset a mystery. Only as the campaign went on did the French scheme of operations become apparent. Even then the part of the scheme still to come remained unfathomable. It has been assumed that with the employment of armies formed of millions of men the element of surprise must be banished. That was a German theory. The theory is unsound. Now, as ever, intellect is the ultimate commanding quality in war. In truth, the factor of intellect was never more commanding than under conditions of war carried on with mass armies. Reflect upon the difference between an opponent who, under such conditions, is able to fathom and to provide against hostile moves, and the opponent who has to take his measures in the dark as to hostile intentions. The former can issue his orders with the reasonable certainty that they are what the situation will call for. Never were orders and instructions more complex than with modern armies numbering millions; never were there more contingencies to provide against and to foresee. To move and to manipulate these vast masses with effect, accurate _anticipation_ is essential. Such complicated machines cannot be pushed about on the spur of the moment when a general suddenly wakes up to a discovery. It follows that to conduct a campaign with mass armies there must either be a plan which you judge yourself strong enough in any event to realise or a plan which, because your opponent cannot fathom it, must throw him into complete confusion. The former was the German way; the latter the French. That General Joffre would _try_ in the first place to defeat the German armies in detail was not, of course, one of the surprises, because it is elementary, but that he should have so largely _succeeded_ in defeating them was a surprise.