In the face of these facts, it is no exaggeration to say that the German losses must have been at least 250,000. To that has to be added nearly 70,000 prisoners. They lost also by capture or by abandonment about a tenth part of their artillery, besides masses of ammunition and transport. FOOTNOTE: [15] From the Oise to the Seine the general aspect of this part of France is a succession of broad ridges separated by valleys, some of them narrow and deep. One-fifth of the whole surface is covered by woods and forests of oak, beech and chestnut. Many of the forests are of great extent. The main ridge was the site of the battle in its first phases. CHAPTER VI HOW GENERAL VON KLUCK AVERTED RUIN The German defeat had indeed been decisive. On the other hand, the defeat did not, in the immediate sequel, yield for the Allies all the results which might have been looked for. There have been misimpressions on both points. Take the first misimpression. A victorious general, it has been well said, rarely knows the full damage he inflicts. Over the wide area covered by the Battle of the Marne and by the pursuit, it was not humanely possible to collect and to collate precise information without some delay. All the same, the French General Staff and the French War Ministry had by September 12 gathered facts enough to form a fairly accurate estimate of advantages won. Beyond vague indications of their nature, however, these facts were not made public. There was at the time a good reason. Situated as the German armies were, and with their intercommunication disorganised, they would take two or three days longer at least to discover on their part the full measure of their losses, and to judge of the effect. To the Allies, that difference in time was of the utmost moment. Certainly it would have been against their interest by publication of details to tell the German General Staff in effect what reinforcements they ought to send, and where they ought to send them. Why the difference in time was of moment will presently appear. Again it has been repeatedly stated that the foremost effect of the Battle of the Marne was to confirm to the Allies the initiative which the strategy of General Joffre had so skilfully gained. That was one effect assuredly, and a vitally important effect. Another effect, however, hardly less important, was that, in point of military value and for effective operations, the German force in France was no longer the same. The blow had been too severe. Never again could that force be levelled up to those armies which had crossed the Marne in the confidence of prospective victory.