Late that night (the 15th), towards ten o’clock, news of Ney’s attack at Frasnes was received by the Prince of Orange at Braine-le-Comte. The latter forwarded the report to Wellington, adding that Saxe Weimar had fallen back to Quatre-Bras, and that the French advance had been checked there. A despatch from Blucher at Namur also reached Wellington about this time, and the Duke decided to march his troops more to their left--_i.e._ towards the Prussians. He therefore issued a second batch of orders that night, directing Cooke’s Division from Enghien to Braine-le-Comte; Clinton’s and Colville’s Divisions from Ath and Grammont to Enghien; and the cavalry from Ninove to Enghien. The other dispositions were to remain as they were. At the close of the 15th, Napoleon’s position promised success for his efforts next day. Blucher had only Zieten’s Corps concentrated at Ligny; Pirch’s Corps was still some miles back. Wellington’s army was still far from Quatre-Bras. Surely, if Napoleon advanced to the attack of the Prussians at daybreak on the 16th, he must, with his overwhelming forces, crush half of Blucher’s army and force the remainder to fall back on Liège? And Ney, if he attacked with Reille’s and d’Erlon’s Corps (for the latter might have pushed on during the night)--or even with Reille’s Corps and Piré’s Cavalry--could have driven back the English force at Quatre-Bras, which, by daybreak on the 16th, had only been reinforced by the remainder of Perponcher’s Dutch-Belgian Division? Ney had ridden to Charleroi in the night, and had had an interview with Napoleon. He must, therefore, have known the state of affairs in the centre and on the right; he must have told Napoleon how matters stood on his wing. Why did not Napoleon order him to attack Quatre-Bras at daybreak on the 16th? There is no satisfactory answer. It is inconceivable that Napoleon, than whom no general has ever been bolder and more decisive in his moves or quicker to take action at critical moments, should have neglected to spend the night of the 15th in bringing up the troops in rear--Lobau’s Corps, d’Erlon’s Corps, Gérard’s Corps. What if the columns had straggled out and become doubled in length? Had Napoleon’s troops never made a greater effort in his earlier campaigns? There is no doubt existing that Napoleon, great warrior as he was, let his opportunity slip on the night of the 15th. His advanced troops were within 2 miles of Ligny, and 3 of the Quatre-Bras-Sombreffe road. Was not this the very point he had aimed at so carefully in his plan of campaign? He was already almost master of the line of junction of Wellington’s and Blucher’s armies. He had, in fact, almost, but not quite, attained the main objective of his scheme. It was within his grasp on the night of the 15th. How could Wellington prevent Ney from capturing Quatre-Bras at daybreak on the 16th? And how could Blucher save Ligny and Sombreffe, if Napoleon chose to bring up his two Corps