12. _Grouchy’s Retreat._ CHAPTER VIII.--A few points concerning Grouchy’s retreat may be discussed briefly. Firstly, could he have been intercepted before he reached Namur? The answer is Yes, by Pirch I. Pirch had received orders, on the night of the 18th, to cut off Grouchy from the Sambre; and he had accordingly marched towards Namur through Maransart. He reached Mellery at 11 A.M. on the 19th. At this hour, Grouchy had not begun his retreat. But Pirch’s men were tired, and they were halted at Mellery. Had they pushed on another six miles to Gembloux, which they would have reached at 2 P.M., Grouchy’s retreat on Namur would have been intercepted. It is true that Grouchy’s force would have greatly outnumbered Pirch’s, but the former would not stop to engage the Prussians at Gembloux while Thielemann pressed close on his heels. He would have been forced to make a very wide detour, and in the meantime the Prussians could have hastened on and captured Namur. Secondly, after Namur, why was not Grouchy more closely pursued? It would have been an idle move to detach a force to follow Grouchy while the advance on Paris was of such immediate importance. At best, Grouchy could threaten the Prussian flank; but he would be more likely to endeavour to join with the remnants of Napoleon’s army collected by Soult. Little harm could be done by these forces; and the contagion of defeat might have spread from Soult’s fugitives and demoralised Grouchy’s men. In any case, the other allied armies were approaching the frontier, and these would be able to deal with Grouchy. The important move was to march on Paris, where the populace, sickened by Napoleon’s collapse, were likely to accept terms. Thirdly, could Grouchy really hope to effect anything advantageous by his retreat on Paris? No, unless he saw a chance of persuading Napoleon to put himself at the head of his troops and the Paris garrison, and march out to repeat the strokes of 1814; but on the 22nd Napoleon had abdicated. Fourthly, could he have effected more by marching south to rally Suchet and Lecourbe? Hardly; since overwhelming armies were approaching on that side, and the fall of Paris would render resistance in the country districts useless. His case was really hopeless from the first. The allies in their march on Paris would ignore him, and, moving by a much more direct road, would reach the capital first. The triple line of fortresses across the line of advance of the enemy, were expected to bar his approach, but they were weakly garrisoned by ill-disciplined and raw troops, whose whole spirit was shaken by Napoleon’s great defeat. So far-reaching is the effect of a defeat as great as Waterloo that armies, districts, even capitals, miles from the real theatre of war, possibly in other countries, seem to crumble to dust before the conqueror; but no fall from might and power has ever been so great as Napoleon’s. FOOTNOTES: [1] Houssaye. [2] Houssaye.