The position in brief was that the total German force in France had been brought up to at least a million men above the immense, and as it was supposed crushing, strength of the initial Expeditionary Force, and that, too, despite the losses incurred. Many of the facts relating to this war are so wholly without parallel that not a few people, unaware of the true vastness and menace of the military system of modern Germany, find it hard to give them credence. As nearly as possible, however, the figures of the forces sent from Germany into Belgium and France will be found to be these: Original Expeditionary Force (25 Active and 3 Reserve Corps) 1,680,000 Fresh drafts to supply losses (approximately) 450,000 Additional Reserve Corps 1,260,000 --------- Total 3,390,000 The problem of dealing with such a force, and of dealing with it when the total strength that could on the side of the Allies then be put into the field against it was in round figures a million less, is a problem quite unlike anything in war since in 1814 Napoleon fought the memorable campaign which preceded his abdication and exile to Elba.[1] [1] This statement is based on the following facts which at this date (the beginning of October) summarises the then immediately prospective situation as regards numbers:-- Total German forces sent into or about to be sent into France and Belgium 3,390,000 Less casualties and wastage approximately 900,000 --------- Net German forces 2,490,000 Allies:-- Nine French armies, reinforced to full strength 1,080,000 10th French army (in formation) 120,000 British (including forces at Ghent) 145,000 Belgians 40,000 --------- 1,385,000 --------- 1,105,000 The disparity of course was afterwards redressed. It took, as it proved, some twenty days before all the additional German forces could be sent West, and on the other hand the embodiment of French Reservists was proceeding at the same time, but the possibility, not to say the probability, that the Germans would get in first, constituted the crisis.