After the attack upon Rheims came the attempted German turning movement north of the Somme through Albert. Here, however, the Germans found themselves unexpectedly confronted by yet two other French armies under the command of Generals D'Armade and Maudhuy. Their great plan for re-seizing the initiative consequently still hung fire. General Joffre had been at work to good purpose. The result was to extend the fighting front from the Oise to the great northern coalfield. All this while the Russian pressure on the East front had been growing and that prospective but fatal division of German forces was threatening to become more inevitable. All this while, too, in order eventually to avoid that division more German reinforcements were pouring west. As it stood at the beginning of October the position was thus: at Antwerp there was the Belgian army; at Ghent, under the command of Sir Henry Rawlinson there was the 7th British division of infantry, and the 3rd brigade of cavalry; there were some, though not many, British troops at Dunkerque; there were a few French troops at Bethune. Practically, however, between Ghent and the terminus of the French front west of Lens there were no Allied forces. Here was a gap of nearly 60 miles. If through that gap the Germans could push their way in strength, they could (1) Separate the Belgian army and the British troops in Belgium from the rest of the Allied armies; (2) Reach the coast and cut the most direct communications with England; (3) Pursue their outflanking scheme by turning the right of the French line. For the Germans the necessity for carrying out that scheme had day by day become more urgent. The opportunity at last seemed to lie to their hand. They proceeded to seize it. Now let us turn to the other side. If General Joffre could close this gap and extend his line directly northwards to the coast, he would (1) Save a considerable slice of territory and coast from German occupation; (2) Keep open the most direct communication with England; (3) Both defeat the German outflanking scheme, and himself outflank the enemy; (4) Impose on the Germans the necessity, arising from such a position, of constant counter attacks, and so waste their strength; (5) Hold them ineffective on the West whatever might happen on the East; (6) Compel them to meet Russian pressure on the East out of their further reserves, and thus ensure at once the division of their forces, their more rapid exhaustion, and the victory of the Allies in the war.