Brave and chivalrous indeed, for they sailed they knew not whither, to encounter an unknown enemy. It might be that they were to force a landing at once under the very guns of Sebastopol, and by sheer audacity achieve the capture of the renowned fortress. It might be that, debarking at a distance from that spot, they would be exposed to toilsome marches, in an enemy’s country, harassed by clouds of Cossacks, and opposed by great armies, in strong positions, infinitely outnumbering their own force, when even continuous victory would necessarily be almost entire annihilation. But, like the errant-knights of old, they anticipated no difficulties, and bore a stout heart for any fate. English and French, officer and man, seemed to have but one desire, that of meeting all foes at all hazards, and winning gallantly or dying gloriously. The general instructions furnished to Marshal St. Arnaud (who, by reason of the French army being so numerically superior to the English, and his military rank as marshal being higher than that of Lord Raglan, assumed the rank of generalissimo of the expedition), and which were understood to have been drawn up by the Emperor Louis Napoleon himself, though leaving to the discretion of the Generals the point of debarkation on the shores of the Crimea, yet strongly recommended--so strongly, in fact, as almost to amount to a command--the choice of Kaffa as the most convenient spot. It was, we cannot help believing, exceedingly fortunate that the allied Generals resolved upon examining for themselves the locality, and ultimately rejected the plans of the Emperor. Kaffa, it is true, affords the largest bay and the most secure anchorage in the Crimea, and, had they been the only requisites, there could have been little doubt that the imperial scheme would have been adopted. But the fleet was only valuable in the expedition as an auxiliary to the army--as a basis of operations, a depôt of stores, a means of conveying reinforcements, an assistant in the actual bombardment, or a medium of retreat in event of a disaster. For all practical purposes Sebastopol was the Crimea; and Sebastopol is on the western coast, while Kaffa is on the eastern, at least 100 miles distant. Had the object been to provide for the security and comfort of the fleet, it might as well have been in snug quarters at Spithead or Cherbourg, as at Kaffa, and there it would have been about as useful. The plan of Napoleon was to seize the town of Kaffa, thence to march across the peninsula, taking possession of Karu-Bazar, Simferopol, and Baktchi-Serai, thus advancing to Sebastopol, and securing the harbour of Balaklava, as a naval basis near the scene of intended operations. But the Emperor, by some strange oversight, seems to have forgotten his own previous caution not to separate from the fleets, when he sketched out the march of an army, only 50,000 strong, encumbered with necessary ammunition