and baggage, along a road forty miles from the sea in some parts, through a mountainous district, in an enemy’s country, for a 100 miles, exposed to continued encounters with immense armies, and necessitated to seize and retain possession of, at least, three large towns, strongly garrisoned. It is true, a force stationed at Kaffa might intercept reinforcements arriving from Asia, or along the narrow strip of land bridging the Putrid Sea; but what was to hinder the arrival of the legions which should be poured into the Crimea, through Perekop, the most direct and available route from the very heart of the military strength of Russia, on the first intelligence of the invasion? Supposing, too, that a sufficient force to hold Kaffa had been left in occupation there (and if it had not been, what would have prevented the arrival of troops from Asia and the north, which would have followed the invaders, and enclosed them between two fires?)--that the three great towns had been captured and consequently garrisoned--or where the utility of taking them?--deduct the necessary casualties of the march, and the inevitable results of the unavoidable battles, even supposing them to have been victories, and how many men could possibly have arrived before Sebastopol out of 50,000? The expedition to the Crimea at all was romantic, and is said to have been strongly opposed by some of our most able Generals; but this contemplated march through a mountainous region, interposing innumerable obstacles to transit, in the face of a powerful enemy, far from assistance, cut off from supplies of food or ammunition, with three fortified towns to capture, at least several pitched battles to fight, and, as a finish to the prospect, the most strongly fortified town in the world to reduce, was the very absurdity of Quixoteism.