As fast as the Belgian Army regained its strength the front was extended further, along the Yperlée and the Ypres canal, to the north of Steenstraat in the first instance, and then to Boesinghe. So it is really the Belgian Army which has definitely organised the whole front up to the latter place, over a distance of at least 31 kilometres. If one considers only the portion which had to be defended by the army in the early stages--that between the sea and Fort Knocke--it is clear that a heavy strain was put upon the weak effectives left in being after the battle of the Yser--a strain all the greater because the gaps in the ranks could be filled but slowly and with great difficulty. The inundations certainly protected a large part of the front and made the enemy's attacks less formidable. But the protection might be nullified by frost. A great deal of work was, therefore, needed to enable the area of the inundation to be regulated at will, to prevent the water invading our own trenches, and to make it impossible for the enemy to use the inundation against us. It would be a serious mistake to assume that this sheet of water formed an impassable obstacle at all points. Where it seemed to give the greatest security--between the Nieuport-Dixmude railway and the Yser--the roads and tracks, which are causeways in all weathers, and the small risings in the ground near the buildings and farms scattered about the country, stood out of the great lagoon and offered chances of getting across, or formed islands that might usefully be occupied. From the first Belgians and Germans had fought for the possession of these points, in order to cover their main positions and prevent access to them by the creation of advanced posts in the very heart of the floods. Further to the south, the water had spared the Dixmude region, where the ground rises slightly. At this place the two foes lay facing one another, separated only by the width of the Yser--some 15 to 20 yards. Just as it was necessary to organise a bridgehead able to resist any attack at Nieuport--where the locks are--so at Dixmude, where we were in close contact with the enemy, we had to construct a bastion of the strongest possible kind, since this was a vital spot in the Belgian line, and the enemy's repeated attempts upon it showed clearly enough how extremely important he considered its possession to be. Still further south, the Belgian front clung to the western bank of the canal formed by the Yser and Yperlée, while the enemy occupied the other, keeping as close to it as he could and standing off only when compelled to do so by the floods.