Primitive societies, as we know them by direct observation, may be likened to people lying torpid upon a ledge on a mountainside, with a precipice below and a precipice above; civilizations may be likened to companions of these “sleepers of Ephesus” who have just risen to their feet and have started to climb on up the face of the cliff.[18] This image (further elaborated in the book, and duly illustrated with a picture in _Time_ magazine) does a great deal more than tell us that primitive societies are static and civilizations dynamic. The dominating feature of the image is the rock cliff with its succession of ledges and precipices. Where is the historical reality corresponding to this scenery which exists _independent_ of the sleepers and climbers and _determines_ their direction? The “one-way street” likewise suggests a predetermined orientation and limitation of cultural endeavour. Toynbee believes that there is a cliff to be climbed, a street to be followed. Yet the truth is—in the terms of his images—that we see figures at rest or on the move in a cloudy space but know nothing about their relative position: we do not know which ledge is above or below which other ledge. Or again: we see motor cars moving, halting, or out of order. But we do not know whether they move in an alley, or on a four-drive highway, on an open plain, or within a circle—we do not even know whether there is an entrance or exit at all. Toynbee’s images betray an evolutionistic as well as a moral bias which interferes with the historian’s supreme duty of doing justice to each civilization on its own terms. Why should we characterize civilizations which have achieved a deep and lasting harmony (like those of the Zuni or of certain Polynesians) as “arrested civilizations” where “no energy is left over for reconnoitring the course of the road ahead, or the face of the cliff above them, with a view to a further advance”?[19] Where is this road or this cliff? Why should these chimaeras and a feverish desire for “advancement” disturb the satisfaction of people who have attained the double integration of individual and society and of society and nature? Toynbee merely projects postulates which fulfil an emotional need in the West into human groups whose values lie elsewhere. In our own terms: Toynbee declares the “dynamism” of western civilization to be universally valid; and he can do that only by ignoring the “form” of non-western civilizations. But understanding is thereby precluded.