[Frontispiece: STORMING THE MOLE. _Drawn by Charles De Lacy from details supplied by the Author_] THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE BY CAPTAIN A. F. B. CARPENTER, V.C., R.N. WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY ADMIRAL EARL BEATTY AND APPRECIATIONS BY MARSHAL FOCH, REAR-ADMIRAL SIMS AND COUNT VISART (BURGOMASTER OF BRUGES) WITH ILLUSTRATIONS BOSTON AND NEW YORK HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY The Riverside Press Cambridge 1922 COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY ALFRED F. B. CARPENTER ALL RIGHTS RESERVED The Riverside Press CAMBRIDGE -- MASSACHUSETTS PRINTED IN THE U.S.A. TO THE MAN-IN-THE-STREET {vii} INTRODUCTION BY ADMIRAL EARL BEATTY In appreciating the military reasons which directed the operations connected with the blocking of Zeebrugge, it is desirable to recall to mind the general naval situation at the beginning of 1918. Briefly stated, the German High Seas Fleet was contained within the waters of the Heligoland Bight by the British Grand Fleet, whilst German submarines were engaged on vast operations, having for their object the stoppage of the trade of Great Britain, and interference with our lines of communication. In the face of such an attack, the aim of Great Britain was either to destroy the enemy submarines, or, failing destruction, to prevent their egress from their bases. Convoy operations, patrol operations, and mining operations in all seas were carried out to achieve the former aim, and accomplished great results. But enemy submarines continued to be built almost as rapidly as they were destroyed. It was essential, therefore, to take what measures were possible to render useless their bases and interfere with their freedom of exit, and it was with this military object that plans for the blocking of Zeebrugge were initiated. Emphasis has been laid on the military reason which underlay this operation, because an erroneous impression has existed in some quarters that the Zeebrugge operations were more in the nature of an offensive designed to lower the morale of the enemy and enhance that of the British Navy, which, as a whole, had little opportunity of coming to grips with the enemy. {viii} Whilst these moral results undoubtedly were felt after the operation, they were not the military reasons, reasons alone which justified so complex and difficult an undertaking, reasons which were never lost sight of during the planning and carrying out of the operations. The plan was surely laid; simple in general design, details were worked out with foresight and exactitude. The factors of surprise, mystification, and diversion were utilised to the utmost. The resources of science were given full scope. Training to carry out the plan proceeded with energy and understanding, co-ordination and co-operation being apparent throughout. It was carried out with determination.