Many months after the blocking of Zeebrugge had become an accomplished fact two earlier schemes came to light--these having emanated from the author of that submitted in May, 1917. In November, 1917, however, the only previous proposals which were available for consideration by the Planning Division of the Staff were those of November, 1916, and May, 1917, mentioned above. In November, 1917, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe was First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff. He had requested the Director of Plans to consider, amongst many other things, the possibility of blocking the Belgian ports. {18} The Plan was _evolved in the Admiralty_, being commenced on November 13th, and laid before Their Lordships on December 3d. The Plan was accepted as feasible, and earned Their Lordships' decision to have it carried out. No previous Plan had reached that stage. The original edition of the Plan did not emanate from another country, or from civilian sources, or from any other source outside the Admiralty buildings in Whitehall except in so far as the details of one particular phase of the operation were the outcome of conversations, at the headquarters of the Air Force, with an expert on the formation of artificial fogs. [Sidenote: The Conception of the Plan] The foregoing definite fact has been purposely inserted to correct other statements which have been published elsewhere, presumably in error. I shall deal with the details of the Plan in a subsequent chapter. Before leaving the consideration of the _origin_ of the Plan, I should like to emphasise one particular point. Perhaps this can be most readily illustrated by a simple simile. An uncorked bottle, containing some noxious fluid, stands upon the table. You realise the disagreeable results which will follow on the escape of its contents. You cork the bottle. Now your action is so obviously correct that you scarcely give it another thought. If any credit was due to anybody you would probably take it to yourself; you would not apportion any particular merit to that fond parent who first initiated you into this obvious solution of the problem. In the case, therefore, of the Blocking of Zeebrugge one need not apportion credit to the person who first _suggested the mere idea_; the credit is entirely due to the man who, in spite of all the difficulties, {19} evolved a _method_ of "corking the bottle" and who, later, overcoming the great obstacles in the way, carried the method into execution. Before we pass on to review the difficulties of blocking the exits from the German bases it would be advisable to consider the probable effects of such an operation; this being the logical sequence actually followed before the details of the Plan were formulated.