[29] The treasure ship was well armed and did not hesitate to engage him. Anson’s success was in some considerable measure attributable to the fact that not having enough men for the broadside firing of the period, he ordered independent firing. It was the Spanish custom to lie down as the enemy fired a broadside, then jump up and fire back. Anson’s independent firing caused much unexpected slaughter on them. This rule of “broadsides” compares interestingly with the salvo firing of the present day. [30] See earlier reference to the same thing in Raleigh’s time. [31] Is the well-known _Royal George_, which capsized at Spithead, in 1782. [32] Admiral Mahan (_Influence of Sea Power upon History_, p. 286) shows how Byng’s dread of anything unconventional in the way of tactics led to the action being indecisive. [33] Time after time, hostile ships, having had enough of it, passed away ahead and escaped, because to have pressed them would have “disorganised the line.” [34] Our own naval manœuvres in recent years have seen more than one disaster from the change of a rendezvous. [35] While this battle of Quiberon was in progress, people in England were burning Hawke in effigy for having allowed the French fleet to escape! [36] This appears to be the solitary instance in French history in which a use of the fleet on English lines was ever contemplated. [37] Admiral Mahan (_Influence of Sea Power upon History_) has quoted at length (p. 380) from French authorities to show that only the action of the captain of the _Destin_ (74), in hurrying to block the gap, prevented Rodney from getting through the line on this occasion. [38] I draw this from Mahan (_Influence of Sea Power upon History_) (page 494). Fincham specifically mentions (p. 107) the introduction of carronades _ten_ years later. [39] Fincham _ex_ Campbell. [40] The fire-ship grew to be less and less of a menace owing to the improved handiness of warships. [41] Here again see Raleigh on Elizabethan Customs. [42] By the burning of the bulk of the ships in Toulon, the French Toulon fleet was rendered non-existent; but the state of affairs with that fleet was such that its fighting value had long been a cypher. [43] In order to bring the enemy to action, Howe formed a detached squadron of his faster ships. Hannay (_Ships and Men_) extols him because, in this and certain other movements in the battle, he reverted to the tactics of Monk and other Commonwealth admirals, and threw aside the conventional practice of his own day. [44] For two opposite views of this particular incident, see Admiral Mahan’s _Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution_, and Chapter X. of Brassey, 1894. [45] The preservation of an orderly line throughout the battle. [46] The story of this ship going down firing, her crew crying _Vive la Republique_, is pure fiction. She surrendered after a very gallant fight, and sank with an English flag flying.