The British battle fleet, Vol. 1 (of 2) : $b its inception and growth throughout the centuries to the present day — John Shaqi
The British battle fleet, Vol. 1 (of 2) : $b its inception and growth throughout the centuries to the present dayJane, Fred T. (Frederick Thomas)
History
The British battle fleet, Vol. 1 (of 2) : $b its inception and growth throughout the centuries to the present day
Jane, Fred T. (Frederick Thomas)
Great Britain -- History, Naval; Great Britain. Royal Navy -- History; Warships -- Great Britain -- History
Considering the number of battles and the desperate nature of them, it
is perhaps curious to note the relatively small amount of damage done.
With the advent of the porthole and the consequent multiplication of
guns a hundred and fifty years before, it had seemed that any naval
engagement must result in swift mutual destruction. Much the same kind
of idea obtained as when at the end of 1910 a squadron of Dreadnoughts
almost instantly obliterated a target five miles off. But as in the
Armada fights, so in this First Dutch War, an immense amount of
fighting was done with comparatively, and relatively to what might have
been anticipated, small harm on either side.
This result is partly to be attributed to the fact that defence
increased with offence. The warship proper was designed to stand
hammering, and every increase in size, involving increased gun-carrying
capacity, involved also increased strength of construction. Something
may also be put down to the very inferior artillery then in use, and
the great deal of boarding which took place.
There is some reason to believe that Cromwell, with his complete
recognition of the advantages of naval power, with his assiduous
energy in the creation of a strong fleet, recognised--as perhaps both
Buckingham and Phineas Pett had done before--the advantages of the “big
ship.” Yet under his rule no appreciable advance in size took place.
Nor, for that matter, did it take place any time within a hundred and
fifty years later on.
The reason is interesting. It was purely a matter of trees. The length
of a ship was circumscribed by the height of trees; other dimensions
by similar hard facts. The beam was dependent on the ship’s length;
while the draught was governed by the harbours and docking facilities.
It is doubtful whether any man ever sought to solve the problem of an
invincible navy with more energy than Oliver Cromwell; yet under his
rule nothing in the way of improvement was evolved at all comparable
with the step taken with the _Royal Sovereign_ under the weaker Charles
Stuart--Buckingham régime. The limitations of the tree proved the
limitations of the ship.
When Cromwell died, his record was left in numbers. The Navy at his
death consisted of 157 ships. His architectural improvements were but a
new form of bottoms.[16]
Oliver Cromwell had not been long dead when the Navy--then under
Monk--decided to restore the Monarchy. It sailed to Holland, embarked
Charles II and James, Duke of York, and established Charles on the
throne without opposition. Monk is popularly regarded as a political
time-server. But in his change of sides he made one very important
stipulation: that Charles was to pledge himself to the upkeep of the
fleet. The fleet accomplished the Restoration. The bulk of evidence is
that it did so with little regard for any issue other than the naval
one.
_THE SECOND DUTCH WAR._
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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