With early morning on Tuesday, September 20th, the troops were up and stirring; but the march did not begin for some hours afterwards, and this circumstance has given rise to severe strictures by several French writers on the conduct of our generals on the occasion. At 5 o'clock on the evening of the 19th, says M. de Bazancourt, M. St. Arnaud convened the French Generals before his tent, and explained to them verbally his plan of battle, concerted with the English Commander-in-Chief. This plan was that the English army should execute "a turning movement on the Russian right, whilst its attention was seriously drawn on its left by a French division, and that the bulk of the army should make a powerful effort to force the Russian centre." General Bosquet, who had charge of the French right, consisting of the 2nd Division, supported by the Turks, was to turn the Russian left by the abrupt slopes, "judged (by the Russians) to be inaccessible," and therefore not defended by artillery. The 1st and 3rd Divisions were to assault the centre of the position--the 4th Division forming the reserve. The hour of starting was fixed as follows:--The French right wing at 5.30 A.M.; the left wing, formed by the English, at 6 A.M.; the centre at 7 A.M. Having given these explanations to his generals, M. St. Arnaud sent Colonel Trochu, with General Rose, across to Lord Raglan, to inform him of the plan, and the hours fixed for the march of the troops, which Lord Raglan "accepted entirely" in detail. On this statement it may be remarked, that if the plan had been "concerted" between the Generals, as the French writer declares, there was no necessity for Lord Raglan's acceptance of a proposition which he had, conjointly with another, previously agreed to. In order to obtain unity of action in the allied movements Prince Napoleon and General Canrobert received orders to communicate with Lord Raglan and with Sir De Lacy Evans, who commanded the 2nd Division, immediately in proximity with the French. [Sidenote: PLAN OF ATTACK.]