The French writer proceeds:--"At 5.30 the 2nd Division quitted its bivouac, and descended into the plain towards the Alma, which it reached at 6.30, but no movement was visible among the English army. General Canrobert and Prince Napoleon, astonished at this immobility, so contrary to the instructions, went in all haste to Sir De Lacy Evans, whom they found in his tent, and expressed their astonishment at a delay which might gravely compromise the success of the day. 'I have not received the order,' replied Sir De Lacy Evans. They were at once obliged to arrest the march of Bosquet's division, and on informing the Marshal, who was already mounted, of what had passed, he sent over a staff officer, Major Renson, to order them to wait for the English troops, who were _en retard_, and despatched Colonel Trochu in all haste to Lord Raglan, whom he found on horseback, although the English troops were still in the encampment as he passed the lines, and not at all prepared for the march as agreed upon. It was half-past 7 o'clock when Colonel Trochu reached the head-quarters of our army; and when Lord Raglan had received the message which the Marshal sent, to the effect that he thought, after what his lordship said to the Colonel the night before, that the English should push on in front at 6 o'clock, he said with that calm which distinguished him,--'I am giving orders at this moment, and we are just about to start. Part of my troops did not arrive at their bivouac till late at night. Tell the Marshal that at this moment the orders are being carried all along the line.'" It will be observed that General Evans was not only not asked for his opinion in concerting the plan of attack, but that he was not even made acquainted with it. This is the more inexplicable, that General Evans' Division, from its position, would necessarily have to co-operate with the French. As it is desirable that the point of order as to this march should be fully illustrated, I think it best to let Sir De Lacy Evans speak for himself. "Shortly after daybreak on the morning of this battle his Imperial Highness Prince Napoleon and General Canrobert did me the honour to come into my tent to confer on the co-operation of my division with that of the Prince in the ensuing conflict. They informed me that this co-operation had been agreed to the previous evening between the two commanders-in-chief, expressed surprise that I had not been made acquainted with it, and showed me a well-executed plan by the French staff of the Russian position, and of the proposed lines of movement of the allied columns of attack. "According to this plan, General Bosquet's troops and the Turks, supported by the powerful fire of the shipping, were to turn the enemy's left. The second British division, that of the Prince, and two other French divisions, were to attack their centre. The whole of the remainder of the British army was to turn the enemy's right.