13. Eviction is seldom enforced, except in the case of bad and wasteful tenants; good and improving tenants are never evicted. Therefore, any diminution in the power of eviction would be disastrous to the prosperity of the country by retaining on the land worthless tenants. 14. Most landlords do properly compensate their tenants for any improvements effected by them. 15. They are justified in raising the rents when the land produces greater increase. 16. Even if a few bad landlords injure their tenants, it is unfair to visit on the heads of the majority the sins of the few by bringing them all under the same confiscating law. 17. The existing law provides ample safeguards against arbitrary and unjust eviction; the landlord’s power is sufficiently curtailed. _The relations of landlord and tenant are those of contract; the State must not interfere in freedom of contract._ 18. Any State interference in contract between man and man is very inexpedient and demoralizing, more especially in interference in the matter of price and value. 19. The relations between landlord and tenant are merely those of contract. 20. The movement of progressive societies is from status to contract, and not the reverse. 21. It is illogical and unfair of the tenant to demand freedom of contract in the sale of tenant-right, and ask for curtailment of contract in his dealings with the landlord. _The objections to a fixed rent; and the difficulties in the way of fixing a fair rent._ 22. It would be impossible to fix a rent which would content both parties. 23. As tenants vary in ability, character, and energy, it would be impossible to legislate so that the rent the tenant had to pay would be that which he is able to pay. 24. A fixed rent, even if fair at first, would soon weigh heavily on one or other of the parties. 25. All future enhancements of rent, based on whatever ground, would be strenuously resisted. 26. While the landlord would be bound to accept the valuation, the tenant could refuse to pay it and quit his holding. 27. If the Government, by valuation or arbitration, were to fix the rent, the landlord would consider that he had been guaranteed his rent by the State; while the tenant (in bad seasons) would look to the State to assist him to pay it. 28. If fixity of tenure were conceded, the next demand would be for the abolition of the rent charge, more especially on the ground of increased absenteeism, which would itself have been encouraged by the change. 29. At all events, in bad seasons, a demand would be made for abatement of rent, on the ground that otherwise the value of the tenant-right would be injuriously affected.