30. The power conceded to the landlord of selling the “tenant-right” on breach of contract, would be rendered nugatory by the combination of tenants to prevent a purchase; and so the landlord would be deprived of all means of obtaining his rent, or of preventing subletting or subdivision. 31. It is illogical and unjust that, in the matter of rent, the landlord should be deprived of the benefits of competition, while in the sale of tenant-right competition should be allowed. 32. The landlords, bound by a hard-and-fast rule, would expect to receive their full fixed rents, and would not be willing or able, as they are now, to allow indulgences in time or remission in bad seasons. 33. The pressure of violence would be brought to bear on the valuators to induce them to undervalue the rents. _The right of free sale of “tenant-right” would amount to confiscation of part of the landlord’s property. It would benefit only existing tenants, and would cripple all future tenants._ 34. As the existing tenants would, on the day of the passing of the law, be able to sell their tenant-right for a large sum, _having done nothing_ to earn it, the amount at which it can be valued, is so much subtracted from the rightful gains of the landlord. 35. As tenants had not this scheme in view when they bargained for their farms, its adoption would be conceding them a valuable privilege entirely at the expense of the landlords. 36. Only the existing tenants would benefit pecuniarily from the change; all future in-coming tenants would be burdened by the amount they would have to pay for the “tenant-right,” and the interest on this payment in addition to the “fair” rent, would constitute a sum exceeding any rack-rent. 37. The unhealthy “earth-hunger,” which exists in Ireland, would force up the price of tenant-right far above the real value, and thus entrench on the security of the landlord for his rent, whilst reckless tenants would outbid the prudent. 38. The payment for tenant-right would cripple the in-coming tenant just at the moment when he most required capital to cultivate the land--to the injury of production, while it would leave him no margin to fall back upon in bad times. 39. The tenants who would benefit most would be those who have had indulgent landlords. When rents are low “tenant-right” would be more valuable than when they are high. 40. The tenants can obtain security of tenure by demanding and accepting leases; many landlords are willing to grant long leases at fixed rents on fair terms. 41. Therefore, at the most the law should force the landlords to grant “security leases,” and leave them to obtain (by means of a fine) any extra value which security will fetch. 42. Any further privileges obtained by the tenant would only be used as additional facilities for borrowing money at ruinous rates.