The British Navy in BattlePollen, Arthur Joseph Hungerford
History
The British Navy in Battle
Pollen, Arthur Joseph Hungerford
Great Britain. Royal Navy; World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations
But the departure made in the summer of 1917, though radical as to
principle, was less than half-hearted as to persons. Many of the
men identified with all our previous failures and responsible for
the methods and plans that have led to them, were retained in full
authority. The mere adoption of the staff principle did indeed bring
about an effect so singular and striking as completely to transform
all Allied prospects. In April, defeat seemed to be a matter of a
few months only. By October it had become clear that the submarine
could not by itself assure a German victory. If such extraordinary
consequences could follow--exactly as it was predicted they must--from
a change in system which all experience of war had proved to be
essential, why, it may be asked, was the adoption of the staff
principle so bitterly opposed? Partly, no doubt, because of the natural
conservatism of men who have grown old and attained to high rank in
a service to which they have given their lives in all devotion and
sincerity. The singularity of the sailor’s training and experience
tends to make the naval profession both isolated and exclusive. And
that its daily life is based upon the strictest discipline, that gives
absolute power to the captain of a ship because it is necessary to hold
him absolutely responsible, inevitably grafts upon this exclusiveness
a respect for seniority which gives to its action in every field the
indisputable finality bred of the quarter-deck habit. Thus, there was
no place in Admiralty organization for the independent and expert work
of junior men, because no authority could attach to their counsel. It
is of the essence of the staff principle that special knowledge, sound,
impartial, trained judgment, grasp of principle and proved powers of
constructive imagination, are higher titles to dictatorship in policy
than the character and experience called for in the discharge of
executive command. But to a service not bred to seeing all questions of
policy first investigated, analyzed, and, finally, defined by a staff
which necessarily will consist more of younger than of older men, the
suggestion that the higher ranks should accept the guiding coöperation
of their juniors seemed altogether anarchical. The long resistance to
the establishment of a Higher Command based on rational principles may
be set down to these two elements of human psychology.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account