XVIII. The Dogger Bank.  II 251 XIX. The Battle of Jutland: I. North Sea Strategies 267 XX. The Battle of Jutland (_continued_): II. The Urgency of a Decision 283 XXI. The Battle of Jutland (_continued_): III. The Distribution of Forces 294 XXII. The Battle of Jutland (_continued_): IV. The Second Phase 307 XXIII. The Battle of Jutland (_continued_): V. The Three Objectives 315 The Tactical Plans: Admiral Scheer’s Tactics 317 Sir David Beatty’s Tactics 324 Sir John Jellicoe’s Tactics 326 XXIV. The Battle of Jutland (_continued_): VI. The Course of the Action 330 The German Retreat 333 The Night Actions and the Events of June 1 335 XXV. Zeebrügge and Ostend 341 Strategical Object 342 Sir Roger Keyes’s Tactics 345 Attack on the Mole 352 Moral Effect 353 LIST OF LINE CUTS PAGE Big guns more accurate at long range, because more regular 94 Big guns need less accurate range-finding, because the danger space is greater 95 Range-finding by bracket 97 The crux of sea fighting, changes of course and speed produce an irregularly changing range 98 In this sketch the black silhouette shows the position at the moment the torpedo is fired; the white silhouette the position the ship has reached when the torpedo meets it 107 Plan of _Sydney_ and _Emden_ in action 158 Plan of the action between the British battle-cruisers and the German armoured cruisers 199 Plan of action between _Kent_ and _Nürnberg_, and of that between _Cornwall_ and _Glasgow_ and _Leipzig_ 207 The action off Heligoland up to the intervention of Commodore Goodenough’s Light Cruiser Squadron 235 The action off Heligoland. The course of the battle-cruisers 239 The Dogger Bank Affair. Diagram to illustrate the character of the engagement up to the disablement of _Lion_ 249