It was General Stone’s purpose to cross the Potomac at two points, making a heavy display of force at Edwards’ Ferry, holding General Evans’ attention at that point in his front while making his real attack on the extreme left of the Confederate position, rolling back the small contingent of scouts and pickets about Smart’s Mill and turning the flank of Evans, which would compel a retreat, with Gorman’s brigade to cut him off, and at the same time General McCall’s force about Dranesville, on the Alexandria pike, only a short march away, making a possible combination of at least eighteen thousand men against Evans’ two thousand, with no support nearer than Manassas and Centreville; and moreover, General Stone had further aid in close call on the Maryland side of the river, under Generals Banks and Hamilton, so that when his main attack at the Bluff, with a force more than equal to Evans’ whole command, was made as a surprise, the game was his own, by all the rules of tactics and strategy. General Evans had the evident advantage of his adversary in generalship, and had proven his claim to the pastmaster’s degree in the same situation at the first Manassas, just three months before, where he held the extreme left of Beauregard’s line at the Stone Bridge, and where McDowell applied the same tactics as did Stone on the Potomac. There, as here, the Federals in heavy force demonstrated on Evans’ front at the bridge while moving for the main attack by way of Sudley, far beyond his left, and there their busy delay at the bridge, as here at Edward’s Ferry, caused him to look elsewhere for work, which he soon found to the left. So, leaving a few companies to amuse General Tyler on the turnpike, just as he held the artillery and nine companies of the Thirteenth Mississippi in front of Fort Evans, he hurried his main force to meet the attack on his left. We learned later that our general knew his business, and why he made his battle by detail, as it seemed to us then, and General Beauregard’s instructions give us the reason why he fought here at all. General Evans’ judgement was against giving battle at Leesburg, where all the chances seemed against him, and a few days before he had withdrawn his troops to a strong position at Carter’s Mills,[2] seven miles off on the road towards his only support at Manassas. Upon reporting his movement to Beauregard, that officer gave him further light on the situation, in the following interesting document: “HD. QRS. FIRST CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, NEAR CENTREVILLE, October 17, 1861” “COLONEL: Your note of this date has been laid before the General, who wishes to be informed of the reason that influenced you to take up your present position, as you omit to inform him. The point you occupy is understood to be very strong, and the General hopes you may be able to maintain it against odds should the enemy press across the river and move in this direction.