For over a year we surveyed and analyzed modern treaty experience, particularly looking at instances of violations of treaties, and enforcement measures that were taken, or that could have been taken, in response to these violations. We gave special attention to the enforcement (and non-enforcement) of the Treaty of Versailles; to sanctions and treaty enforcement experience of international organizations like the League of Nations, the Organization of American States, and the United Nations; and to the details of experience in negotiating and enforcing agreements with the Communists since World War II, such as those dealing with access rights to Berlin, the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1961 on Southeast Asia, and the Korean Armistice. We were very pleased with the results of this study, and we understand that the Arms Control Agency was, also. We demonstrated how our Government may profit from its own experience and from that of others in the fields of treaty negotiation and enforcement. Perhaps the most significant study we have done to date, and the one which gives promise of having the greatest impact upon policy makers, is one which we completed for the Army last fall, entitled “Historical Trends Related to Weapon Lethality.” The purpose of the study was to provide useful insights to men who are trying to develop new doctrines, and new organizations, for the most efficient possible employment of the terribly destructive new weapons which are available to the Army today. In the process we surveyed the history of weapons development from the Fourth Century B. C. to the end of the Korean War. This comprehensive survey provided us with a formidable mass of data on weapon experience in the history of war. We grouped related facts according to novel schemes of classification and analysis, and then tried to ascertain what these groupings meant. From this we derived a number of most interesting conclusions. Let me mention a few: