One division at Minden, under Vogel Von Falckenstein; One division (made up principally of the Prussian garrisons withdrawn from the Federal fortresses of Mayence, Rastadt and Frankfort) at Wetzlar, under Von Beyer. The Austrian “Army of the North” was posted as follows: Ist Corps, at Prague, Teplitz, Theresienstadt and Josephstadt; IInd Corps, near Bömisch Trübau; IVth Corps, near Teschen; VIth Corps, at Olmütz; IIId Corps, at Brünn; Xth Corps at Brünn; VIIIth Corps, in the neighborhood of Austerlitz. To these corps were attached five divisions of cavalry and more than 750 guns. This army was under command of Field Marshal Von Benedek, an officer of great experience and high reputation. The Saxon army, 25,000 strong, with fifty-eight guns, was at Dresden, under command of the Crown Prince of Saxony. The Bavarian army was concentrating on the line of the Main between Amberg and Würzburg. It numbered 52,000 men, and was under command of Prince Charles of Bavaria. The VIIIth Federal Corps was forming at Frankfort. It consisted of the contingents of Würtemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau, and an Austrian division drawn from the Federal fortresses. It numbered about 42,000 men, and was under the command of Prince Alexander of Hesse. The Vth, VIIth and IXth Austrian corps, under the Archduke Albrecht, were in Venetia, opposed to an Italian army of four corps. Von Benedek expected to assume the offensive and invade Prussia. He had announced this intention before the beginning of hostilities, even going so far as to prescribe rules for the behavior of his soldiers while in the enemy’s country. It is hard to understand (in the light of subsequent events) the slight esteem in which the Austrians held their opponents before the commencement of hostilities. In a general order issued to his army on June 17, 1866, the Austrian commander says: “We are now faced by inimical forces, composed partly of troops of the line and partly of Landwehr. The first comprises young men not accustomed to privations and fatigue, and who have never yet made an important campaign; the latter is composed of doubtful and dissatisfied elements, which, rather than fight against us, would prefer the downfall of their government. In consequence of a long course of years of peace, the enemy does not possess a single general who has had an opportunity of learning his duties on the field of battle.” Von Benedek’s unfavorable opinion of his adversaries was probably shared by many other prominent European soldiers; for the excellence of the military system of Prussia was, as yet, not appreciated by other nations. Absurd as Von Benedek’s order now appears, it seems to have excited no unfavorable comment at the time of its appearance; and, in fact, the expectation of Austrian success was quite general in Europe.