During the day Von Benedek, becoming alarmed at the progress of the Second Army, countermanded the order for the IIId Corps to move upon Gitschin, and directed it to remain at Miletin. The Ist Corps and the Saxons were ordered to join the main army _via_ Horzitz and Miletin; but the orders, as we have seen, came too late to save them from their defeat at Gitschin. The rest of the army was concentrated before night upon the plateau of Dubenetz, against the army of the Crown Prince, as follows: [Illustration: No. 7. POSITION OF BOTH ARMIES ON THE EVENING OF THE 29TH. JUNE] The IVth Corps at Salney, with the 1st Reserve Cavalry Division, and the 2d Light Cavalry Division on its right and rear; The IId Corps at Kukus, on left of IVth; The VIIIth Corps near Kasow (one brigade in line on left of IId Corps, the other brigades as reserve); The VIth Corps on the left of the VIIIth; The 3d Reserve Cavalry Division on the left of the VIth Corps; The 2d Reserve Cavalry Division on the extreme left wing; The Xth Corps, in reserve, between Stern and Liebthal. Five army corps and four cavalry divisions were thus concentrated on a line five and one-half miles long. The nature of the ground was unfavorable to the interior communications of the line, but it was, in the main, a strong position, with the Elbe on its front, and the fortress of Josephstadt protecting its right flank. The junction of the Prussian armies now seemed assured, and the strategical situation was decidedly against Von Benedek. His great fault was his failure to decide promptly in regard to the army which he should contain while throwing his weight upon the other. Placing an exaggerated value upon his interior position, he does not seem to have considered that every hour of Prussian advance diminished his advantages; and he was, apparently, unable to make his choice of the two plans of operations which presented themselves. His best move, if made in time, would have been against Frederick Charles. True, his communications could have been quickly cut, in this case, by a successful advance of the Second Army across the Elbe; while in moving against the Crown Prince, his communications could not so readily have been seized by Frederick Charles. But, on the other hand, topographical features made it an easier matter to contain the Second Army than the First Army and the Army of the Elbe. If the Austrian field marshal had learned the lesson taught at Atlanta, Franklin and Petersburg, he would have made use of hasty entrenchments. The Xth Corps and VIth Corps, strongly entrenched, could certainly have held the passes against the assaults of the Crown Prince. The ground was admirably adapted to defense, and the entrenchments would have more than neutralized the superiority of the needle gun over the Lorenz rifle. To have invested and reduced the entrenched camps, if possible at all, would have required much more time than Von Benedek would have needed for