Von Benedek had carefully planned an invasion of Prussia. Had he been able to carry the war into that country, his operations might, perhaps, have been admirable; but when the superior preparation of the Prussians enabled them to take the initiative, he seems to have been incapable of throwing aside his old plans and promptly adopting new ones suited to the altered condition of affairs. Von Benedek was a good tactician and a stubborn fighter; but when he told the Emperor “Your Majesty, I am no strategist,” and wished to decline the command of the army, he showed a power of correct self-analysis equal to that displayed by Burnside when he expressed an opinion of his own unfitness for the command of the Army of the Potomac. The brave old soldier did not seem to appreciate the strategical situation, and was apparently losing his head.[9] With all the advantages of interior lines, he had everywhere opposed the Prussians with inferior numbers; he had allowed the Crown Prince to pass through the defiles of the mountains before he opposed him at all; six of his eight corps had suffered defeat; he had lost more than 30,000 men; and now he was in a purely defensive position, and one which left open the road from Arnau to Gitschin for the junction of the Prussian armies. It would have been better than this had the Austrians everywhere fallen back without firing a shot, even at the expense of opposing no obstacles to the Prussian concentration; for they could then, at least, have concentrated their own army for a decisive battle without the demoralization attendant upon repeated defeats. JUNE 30TH. A detachment of cavalry, sent by Frederick Charles towards Arnau, met the advanced-guard of the 1st Corps at that place. Communication was thus opened between the two armies. It was evident that the advance of Frederick Charles would, by threatening the left and rear of the Austrians, cause them to abandon their position on the Elbe, and thus loosening Von Benedek’s hold on the passages of the river, permit the Crown Prince to cross without opposition. The following orders were therefore sent by Von Moltke: “The Second Army will hold its ground on the Upper Elbe; its right wing will be prepared to effect a junction with the left wing of the First Army, by way of Königinhof, as the latter advances. The First Army will press on towards Königgrätz without delay. “Any forces of the enemy that may be on the right flank of this advance will be attacked by General Von Herwarth, and separated from the enemy’s main force.” On this day the armies of Frederick Charles marched as follows: The IIId Corps, to Aulibitz and Chotec; The IVth Corps, to Konetzchlum and Milicowes; The IId Corps, to Gitschin and Podhrad; The Cavalry Corps, to Dworetz and Robaus; The Army of the Elbe, to the vicinity of Libau; The Landwehr Guard Division, which had been pushed forward from Saxony, arrived at Jung Buntzlau.[10]