In order to deliver his dispatches to the Crown Prince, Finkenstein had ridden twenty-two and one-half miles, over a strange road, on a dark, rainy night. Had he lost his way; had his horse suffered injury; had he encountered an Austrian patrol, the history of Germany might have been different. It is almost incredible that the Prussian general should have diverged so widely from the characteristic German prudence as to make success contingent upon the life of an aide-de-camp, or possibly the life of a horse. Even had the other courier, riding _via_ Kamenitz, reached his destination safely, the time that must have elapsed between the Crown Prince’s declension of co-operation and his later promise to co-operate, would have been sufficient to derange, and perhaps destroy, the combinations of Von Moltke. Let us now examine the Austrian position. Derrécagaix describes it as follows: “In front of the position, on the west, ran the Bistritz, a little river difficult to cross in ordinary weather, and then very much swollen by the recent rains. “On the north, between the Bistritz and the Trotina, was a space of about five kilometers, by which the columns of the assailant might advance. Between these two rivers and the Elbe the ground is broken with low hills, covered with villages and woods, which gave the defense advantageous points of support. In the center the hill of Chlum formed the key of the position, and commanded the road from Sadowa to Königgrätz. The heights of Horenowes covered the right on the north. The heights of Problus and Hradek constituted a solid support for the left. At the south the position of Liebau afforded protection on this side to the communications of the army.[12] “The position selected had, then, considerable defensive value; but it had the defect of having at its back the Elbe and the defiles formed by the bridges.” On this subject, however, Hozier says: “The Austrian commander took the precaution to throw bridges over the river. With plenty of bridges, a river in rear of a position became an advantage. After the retreating army had withdrawn across the stream, the bridges were broken, and the river became an obstacle to the pursuit. Special, as well as general, conditions also came into play.... The heavy guns of the fortress scoured the banks of the river, both up and down stream, and, with superior weight of metal and length of range, were able to cover the passage of the Austrians.” In considering the Austrian retreat, we shall find that neither of these distinguished authorities is entirely right, or wholly wrong, in regard to the defects and advantages of the position described. The following dispositions were ordered by Von Benedek: The Saxons to occupy the heights of Popowitz, the left wing slightly refused, and covered by the Saxon Cavalry; The 1st Light Cavalry Division, to the rear and left, at Problus and Prim; The Xth Corps on the right of the Saxons;