To oppose the forces of the allies, Bonaparte had three armies: the Army of the Rhine, numbering one hundred and thirty thousand men, was facing the Austrians in Germany; the Army of Italy, forty thousand strong, was along the Apennines and Maritime Alps; and the Army of Reserve, numbering forty thousand, was assembling near Lake Geneva. It will thus be seen that the allies had two hundred and fifty-two thousand men to oppose the two hundred and ten thousand under the First Consul; and that they possessed the additional advantage of being supreme on the sea. Such was the situation in the spring of 1800. On the 5th of April Melas began active operations along the Apennines. On the 14th of June the campaign ended at Marengo. In two months and ten days the French, guided by the genius of Bonaparte, had compelled Kray to seek safety in the fortified camp of Ulm, and had defeated Melas and gained possession of northern Italy. These great results were due to Bonaparte. It was he that crossed the Alps. In his brain was born the strategy that led to victory. In this campaign Bonaparte calculated carefully every movement; he left nothing to chance. Though fortune favored him in many ways, nevertheless his success was due to his genius and to his mastery of his profession. Strategically these operations were almost perfect, yet they were faulty in execution. "The campaign of Marengo," says William O'Connor Morris, "at least in design, was one of the most dazzling of Napoleon's exploits in war. The plan of issuing from Switzerland by a double movement in the rear of the enemy in Swabia and Italy was perhaps equal to any formed by Hannibal; but the execution of it was far from perfect. Moreau completely failed to cut off Kray. Napoleon made a distinct mistake in marching into the plain of Marengo, and he exhibited in this instance a fierce resolve to encounter his adversary at any risk, which cost him dear on more than one occasion. The most striking feature of this part of his career is the restoration of order in France, her sudden and rapid rise out of misfortune, and the revival of her military power; and though this was largely due to the energy and resource of a great nation not often quelled by disaster, it should perhaps be mainly ascribed to Napoleon's genius." At this time Bonaparte was thirty years of age; he was vigorous in mind and body. He was ambitious, and had a massive determination to succeed. He had a will which no obstacle could daunt, a mind original, bold, profound, quick, and penetrating. His eye pierced the depths and reached the heights of things. With a marvellous intuition he was able at times to foresee just what course his adversaries would take. So accurate was his information, so profound his knowledge of military matters, that he was often able to predict what, under certain conditions, would happen. "He had," says Morris, "a faculty of organisation perhaps never