Second: By making her principal efforts there, she could receive the support of the British fleet in the Gulf of Genoa, and possibly that of the British corps in Minorca. Third: The English favored this plan; for they saw in it a chance to gain possession of Toulon, which was a desirable acquisition on account of the naval establishments there. Fourth: The Royalists of southeastern France were in sympathy with England and Austria, and might possibly aid them at the first opportunity. Fifth: Since Austria knew that Moreau's army was large, and that the Army of Italy was small, she believed that, by taking the defensive in Germany and the offensive in Italy, she could hold in check the larger army, while she overwhelmed the smaller with greatly superior numbers. Consider for a moment the situation as it must have appeared at this time to Austria. Not aware of the existence of the Army of Reserve, she saw only Moreau's army along the Rhine, and Masséna's along the Apennines. Was it not reasonable to suppose that the one hundred and twenty thousand Austrians in Germany might hold in check Moreau's army of one hundred and thirty thousand, while the one hundred and twenty thousand Austrians in Italy destroyed the forty thousand French under Masséna? On the other hand, there were several reasons why this plan should not have been adopted by the Aulic Council. With the Army of Italy in possession of the Apennines and Maritime Alps, flanked on the right by the fortified city of Genoa, Masséna had the advantage of a strong defensive position. Without an enormous superiority in numbers, it was a difficult matter for Melas to drive back the French. And even should he succeed in this undertaking, there still remained the line of the Var, a strongly fortified position, flanked on the north by the Alps and on the south by the sea; a position which could neither be turned nor be forced, except with greatly superior numbers and desperate fighting. To succeed offensively in Italy, the Austrians had therefore to outnumber greatly the French. The French superiority in position counterbalanced the Austrian superiority in numbers. The Austrian plan allowed Bonaparte with inferior forces to hold in check for a time a large Austrian army in Italy, and left him free to direct his remaining forces upon the important points of the theatre of operations. By uniting the Army of Reserve with Moreau's army, he could outnumber his adversary in Germany; or by uniting the Army of Reserve with a corps of Moreau's army, he could descend upon the rear of Melas, and decide in a single battle the fate of Italy.