The principal reasons why Bonaparte chose the Great St. Bernard route having been considered, it will now be of interest to point out the several courses that he might have taken after having descended the Alps into the lower valley of the Aosta. It will be remembered that on the 27th of May Bonaparte was between Ivrea and Chivasso with thirty-five thousand men, and that Melas was at Turin with sixteen or seventeen thousand. At this time Bonaparte might have taken any one of three courses. He might have advanced on Turin, driven back Melas, united with Thurreau's division at Susa, and thus have secured his communications with France by the Mont Cenis route; or he might have crossed the Po at Chivasso, attacked and driven Melas from Turin, then have marched on Genoa by way of Alessandria; or, lastly, he might have marched on Milan, and there have united his army with Moncey's corps. In his memoirs Napoleon himself has discussed the advantages and disadvantages of these plans as follows:-- "Of these three courses, the first was contrary to the true principles of war. Since Melas had considerable forces with him, the French army, therefore, would run the risk of fighting without having a certain retreat, Fort Bard not being then taken. Besides, if Melas should abandon Turin and move on Alessandria, the campaign would be a failure, and each army would find itself in its natural position: the French army resting upon Mont Blanc and Dauphiné; and that of Melas with its left at Genoa, and in its rear the fortified places of Mantua, Placentia, and Milan. "The second course appeared impracticable: how hazardous would have been the situation of the French between the Po and Genoa, in the midst of an army so powerful as that of the Austrians, without any line of operations[9] (communication), any assured retreat.