The Campaign of Sedan: The Downfall of the Second Empire, August-September 1870Hooper, George
History
The Campaign of Sedan: The Downfall of the Second Empire, August-September 1870
Hooper, George
Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871; Sedan Campaign, 1870
There the decision was formally taken to accept
the challenge, the fact was repeated to the crowd who had assembled,
and whose shouts were loud, deep, and prolonged; and that same night
went forth the brief telegraphic orders which from one centre touched
a thousand springs, and called into instant being an army, perfectly
organized, equipped, trained and supplied. So that when Baron Wimpfen,
a secretary of legation, entered Berlin on the 19th of July, and handed
to M. Le Sourd the French declaration of war—the sole official document
on the subject received by Prussia, as Von Moltke bluntly remarks—that
work had already begun which finished in little more than a fortnight,
enabled the King to break into France at the head of more than three
hundred thousand soldiers.
Only one word more need be said on this subject—the causes of the
war. Clearing away the diplomatic mist which hides the realities,
the student will discover two deadly opposites; on one side the
determination of France to insist on a right of meddling with internal
German affairs, and even of prescribing the form or forms which the
national aggregate should assume; on the other, the fixed resolve of
the German people that the French should no longer dictate or pretend
to dictate beyond the Rhine, that an end should be put to the policy
of seeking political profits by fomenting the spirit of discord in
the petty German Courts; and that, if possible, by dint of “Kraft
und Muth,” Germany should secure palpable safeguards against French
invasions, and resume possession of the strongholds and dependent
territories which were acquired, in times of adversity and disunion,
by Louis XIV. Thus, the causes of war were deeply rooted in essential
facts. The moment to be chosen, if it can be said to have been chosen,
was for statesmen to decide. The Imperial Government, down to the last
hour, sought to form a combination adverse to Prussia, intending to
wage war at its own time. Prussia refused to be made the victim of a
triple alliance, and taking a fair advantage of the imperious conduct
of the French Court, seized the golden opportunity, promptly answered
the declaration of war, and struck down the French Empire before its
hesitating and unprepared allies could move a finger to avert a defeat
which neither attempted, nor dared attempt to repair. Austria, the
unready, stood in fear of Russia: Italy, the ambitious, demanded the
right to enter Rome. “We can grant nothing of the kind,” said the
over-confident Duc de Gramont, so late as July 30. “If Italy will not
march,” he exclaimed, “let her sit still.” Abundant evidence exists
to prove that war between France and Germany was solely a question of
time, and Prussia cannot be blamed justly for selecting or seizing the
hour most suitable to her and least suitable to her adversaries. The
Duc de Gramont asserts that neither the Emperor nor the Government nor
France, desired war—certainly not just then; but they intended to make
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