The Campaign of Sedan: The Downfall of the Second Empire, August-September 1870Hooper, George
History
The Campaign of Sedan: The Downfall of the Second Empire, August-September 1870
Hooper, George
Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871; Sedan Campaign, 1870
Not that the military institutions of Prussia, dating back from the
“new model,” devised during the stress of the Napoleonic Wars, had
been fundamentally altered. Nothing was done except to increase the
numbers, close up and oil the machinery, render its working prompt
and easy by prudent decentralization, give it a powerful brain in the
General Staff, and impart to the whole system a living energy. The
art of war, if the phrase may be allowed, was, in accordance with
venerable traditions rooted in the Hohenzollern House, taken up as a
serious business; and that deep sense of its importance which prevailed
at the fountain head, was made to permeate the entire frame. That
is the real distinguishing characteristic of the Prussian, now the
German army, as contrasted with the spirit in which similar labours
were undertaken by some other Powers. The task was a heavy one, but
the three men who set about it were equal to the task. King William,
with a large intelligence, a severe yet kindly temper, and a thorough
knowledge of his work, threw himself heart and soul into the business,
and brought to bear upon its conduct that essential condition of
success, the “master’s eye.” General von Roon framed or sanctioned
the administrative measures which were needed to create an almost
self-acting and cohesive organism, which could be set in motion by a
telegram, as an engineer starts a complicated piece of machinery by
touching a lever. Von Moltke, as chief of the General Staff, supplied
the directing intellect, and established a complete apparatus for
the collection and classification of knowledge, bearing upon military
affairs, which might be applied wherever needed. These men, working
with “unhasting, unresting” diligence, founded a school of war, not
based on “the law of the Medes and Persians which altereth not,” but
upon the vital principle that a good army should possess in itself
such a power of adaptation, as will make it always abreast with the
latest genuine discoveries in tactics, arms, material appliances,
and discipline. Also the army was treated as a great school in which
officers and men alike were teaching and learning from dawn to sunset,
throughout the allotted period of service. The principal trio had other
and able helpers, but they were the main springs moving and guiding the
marvellous product of constant labour applied by rare capacity.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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