The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third EditionRopes, John Codman
History
The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third Edition
Ropes, John Codman
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821 -- Elba and the Hundred Days, 1814-1815; Waterloo, Battle of, Waterloo, Belgium, 1815
The Duke next says that the English Cavalry will be at Nivelles at
noon. The “Disposition” puts them at Braine-le-Comte at 7 A.M. Relying
on this statement, the Duke says they will accomplish the nine miles
between that place and Nivelles by noon.
“The Corps of Lord Hill is at Braine-le-Comte,” is the next and last
statement in the letter. That corps consisted of the 2d and 4th British
divisions, of the 1st Dutch-Belgian division, and of Anthing’s brigade.
As respects the 2d division, the “Disposition” states that it was at 7
A.M. at Braine-le-Comte. The 4th division, the “Disposition” states,
was at Audenarde at 7 A.M. and was marching on Braine-le-Comte; but the
Duke certainly could not have supposed it possible that that division
could have marched from Audenarde to Braine-le-Comte, a distance of
more than thirty miles, between seven and half-past ten in the morning.
And as for the 1st Dutch-Belgian division and the Indian brigade,
the “Disposition” puts them at Sotteghem, a village near Audenarde,
at 7 A.M., and states that they are marching on Enghien. The Duke,
therefore, had not the authority of the “Disposition” for the statement
made in his letter as to these portions of Lord Hill’s Corps; but
then these divisions had been stationed so far away, that probably
he never counted on them at all in his own mind in connection with a
concentration at Quatre Bras. These were the troops which he left at
Hal and Tubize on the day of Waterloo to protect his right.
It is, therefore, we submit, easy to see that the Duke had the
“Disposition” before him when he wrote the letter to Marshal Blücher.
He seems to have taken it,—so to speak,—blindfold; it never seems
to have occurred to him that it was practically impossible that his
various divisions could have been at seven o’clock that morning where
his chief-of-staff had said that they were. He accepted the memorandum
as official, and followed it substantially—with a few deviations, to
be sure, as we have pointed out—in his letter to Blücher. Not only
this; the Duke acted at once on the faith of the representations
contained in the “Disposition.” He, about noon, rode over to Brye to
confer with Marshal Blücher, and to propose to coöperate with him. It
is evident from the narrative[234] of Baron Müffling, who accompanied
the Duke, that Wellington was, in his opinion, laboring under grave
misconceptions as to the whereabouts of his army. The conversation,
according to Müffling, was mainly concerned with the manner of the
promised coöperation,—Gneisenau wishing the Duke to march from Quatre
Bras to Brye, and Wellington being unwilling thus to expose his
communications with Brussels and Nivelles. Towards the close of the
discussion, says Müffling, the Duke adopted a suggestion of his, and
said “I will overthrow what is before me at Frasnes and will direct
myself on Gosselies.” We cite this simply to show how confident
Wellington was that he would find a sufficiently large force at Quatre
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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