The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third EditionRopes, John Codman
History
The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History: Third Edition
Ropes, John Codman
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821 -- Elba and the Hundred Days, 1814-1815; Waterloo, Battle of, Waterloo, Belgium, 1815
Bras on his return from Brye, at about half-past two o’clock. If
Alten’s division was at Nivelles at 7 A.M., _en route_ for Quatre Bras,
it should have arrived there before noon. The reserves, which marching
from Brussels for Quatre Bras, had by 7 A.M. nearly reached Waterloo,
ought to be at Quatre Bras, which is not over eleven miles further,
by 2 or 3 P.M. If the cavalry was actually at Braine-le-Comte at 9
A.M. it might well be at Nivelles by noon, and at Quatre Bras, only
seven miles further, by 3 P.M. Cooke might be expected about the same
time, with his division of Guards. These expectations were no doubt
in the mind of the Duke of Wellington as he rode back to Quatre Bras
from his meeting with Marshal Blücher. The theory advanced, or perhaps
suggested, by the Prussian biographer of Gneisenau, Delbrück,[235]
that the Duke misrepresented the position of his army for the purpose
of inducing Blücher to give battle at Ligny on the strength of his
promise to support him, and of his ability to keep his promise, so that
he, Wellington, might gain the necessary time for the concentration of
his army, has not, in our judgment, anything to support it.[236] The
truth plainly is, that the Duke was himself entirely deceived by the
statement drawn up for his information by his chief-of-staff. He took
it for granted that the troops were where they were stated to be, and
made his dispositions accordingly. He was destined thereby not only
to be greatly disappointed, but to incur imminent danger of defeat.
For, as a matter of fact, many of his divisions were at seven that
morning nowhere near the positions assigned them in Colonel De Lancey’s
Memorandum. We shall refer to this matter in another place; suffice it
to say now that the Duke’s reinforcements came on the field very much
later than he had reason to expect; that the allied troops were for a
couple of hours or so in a very precarious situation, and would without
doubt have been disastrously defeated had Napoleon’s orders been
carried out.
FOOTNOTES:
[230] Müffling (Passages, p. 230) says about 5. Mudford puts it at
7. Gardner, p. 58, at 8. Sir A. Frazer (Letters of Colonel Sir A. S.
Frazer, London, 1859, p. 536), writes at 6 A.M., that he has “just
learned that the Duke moves in half an hour.” The Duke had 22 miles
to ride to arrive at Quatre Bras, and he got there about 10 A.M. His
letter to Blücher is dated 10.30 A.M. Oldfield (MSS.) puts the time of
the Duke’s departure as before that of Sir George Wood and Lieutenant
Colonel Smyth, who “drove out in a calêche of the latter” “between
seven and eight o’clock,” and soon after the departure of the Brunswick
troops, which was “at an early hour.”
[231] Oldfield, MSS.
[232] Von Ollech, p. 125. Maurice, June, 1890, p. 257. App. C, xvi;
_post_, pp. 376, 377.
[233] Charras, vol. 1, p. 192, note, refers to it to show that
Wellington was opposite Frasnes at 10.30 A.M., but he makes no other
reference to it.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account