Consider this a moment. The principal formal order directed Ney, in so many words, to unite the two _corps d’armeé_, and the corps of cavalry, and to take position at Quatre Bras,—not at Frasnes. Even if the Emperor’s letter admitted of a construction at variance with this, so far as the cavalry of the Count of Valmy was concerned, the last order of Soult’s was unmistakable. It left no room for latitude of construction. All the troops were to be united in the effort to get possession of the intersection of the roads, and the cavalry of the Count of Valmy is explicitly included. Instead of carrying out this order, which was both plain and peremptory, and called for the simultaneous employment of his entire command, or, at any rate, for the employment of as much of his command as he could assemble, more than half the force which had been placed at Ney’s disposal was ordered by him to halt and “take position,” “establish themselves,” two miles and more to the south of the cross-roads. He himself, in his letter to the Duke of Otranto,[285] states that the 1st Corps “had been left by him in reserve at Frasnes.” Although this statement is incorrect, inasmuch as that unlucky command never got quite so far as Frasnes, yet it shows beyond controversy what Marshal Ney _intended_ to do with the 1st Corps. He furthermore says in this letter, that it was at the moment when he was about to order it up from Frasnes, that he learned that the Emperor had disposed of it. That is to say, he had actually _intended_ to keep a whole corps of 20,000 men (or at least three-fourths of them) two miles from the battle-field till five o’clock in the afternoon, for (as we shall see hereafter) it was not until five o’clock that he learned that d’Erlon’s Corps had wandered off. FOOTNOTES: [247] _Ante_, p. 54. [248] Doc. Inéd., Heymès’ Rel. p. 6. See _ante_, p. 65, n. 28. [249] Ib., pp. 6, 7. [250] Doc. Inéd., Reille, Not. Hist., p. 57. [251] From the context, he would seem to mean before 7 A.M. [252] Girard’s division was with the main army under Napoleon. [253] _Cf._ La Tour D’Auvergne, p. 189. Muquardt, pp. 145, 146. [254] Doc. Inéd., Reille, p. 57. [255] _Ante_, p. 51. [256] _Ante_, p. 50, n. 25. [257] Doc. Inéd., Heymès, pp. 7, 8. [258] Ib., p. 8. [259] Ib., pp. 5, 7. _Ante_, p. 49. [260] Ib., Reille, p. 57. [261] Doc. Inéd., VII, pp. 26, 27; App. C, xvii; _post_, p. 377. [262] _Ante_, p. 49. [263] Doc. Inéd., Heymès. V, VI, p. 25; App. C, v, vi; _post_, pp. 367, 368. [264] Ib., Reille, p. 57. [265] Ib., p. 57. [266] Doc. Inéd., Reille, p. 57. [267] Reille in his “Notice Historique” says 11 A.M. But his despatch to Ney, in which he says that he read the Flahaut order, is dated 10.15 A.M. Doc. Inéd., XI, pp. 37, 38; App. C, xix; _post_, p. 379. [268] Ib., X, pp. 32 _et seq._ App. C, xviii; _post_, pp. 377, 378. [269] Ib., p. 30: at least this was the opinion of Marshal Ney’s son. [270] Ib., Reille, p. 57.