[271] Ib., XI, pp. 37, 38. App. C, xix; _post_, p. 379. He does not mention in his “Notice Historique” that he delayed executing Ney’s order. [272] The delay thus occasioned is estimated by Charras (vol. 2, p. 238) at an hour and a quarter. It was really an hour and three-quarters, as Reille ought to have started at ten. [273] _Ante_, p. 19. [274] Doc. Inéd., Reille, XII, p. 38; App. C, xx; _post_, pp. 379, 380. [275] Charras, vol. 1, p. 189. _Cf._ vol. 2, p. 238. [276] Doc. Inéd., VII, pp. 26, 27; App. C, xvii; _post_, p. 377. [277] _Ante_, p. 120. [278] Doc. Inéd., VIII, p. 27; App. C, xxi; _post_, pp. 380, 381. [279] That of the Count of Valmy, Kellermann. [280] Doc. Inéd., X, pp. 32 _et seq._; App. C, xvii; _post_, pp. 377, 378. [281] Charras, vol. 1, pp. 204, 205. [282] Doc. Inéd., IX, p. x31; App. C, xxii; _post_, p. 381. [283] Charras (vol. 1, p. 190) says that this order differed from Soult’s previous orders in authorizing Ney to employ the cavalry of the Count of Valmy. But both Soult’s orders direct this in express terms. [284] Doc. Inéd., XII, pp. 38, 39; App. C, xx; _post_, pp. 379, 380. [285] Jones, p. 386. Charras, vol. 1, p. 215. _NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII._ 1. The conduct of Marshal Ney on the 15th and 16th has been the subject of violent and bitter disputes. One principal cause of these disputes lies in the supposition that Napoleon in his accounts of the campaign has misrepresented the facts, so as to throw a large part of the blame for the final disaster undeservedly upon Ney. Accordingly, what Napoleon has said about Ney, and his motives in saying it, have been the subjects of discussion, rather than what Ney himself did. We have strictly confined our narrative to the consideration of Ney’s acts, orders, and statements, supplemented by those of one of his corps-commanders and his chief-of-staff. From these it appears, (a) That Ney was informed of the Emperor’s intentions during the night of the 15th and 16th: (b) That he contented himself, on his return to Gosselies at two o’clock in the morning, with ordering Reille to get his two divisions ready to move: he did not order Reille up to Frasnes as he might have done; nor did he see to it that the places of Reille’s divisions at Gosselies were taken by the two divisions of d’Erlon’s Corps, which, as we have seen,[286] were, at that hour well across the river: (c) That instead of pushing right on to Quatre Bras with all his disposable force when he finally got his written orders, as those orders in express terms peremptorily directed him to do, he ordered three divisions of the 1st Corps to take up a position at Frasnes, two miles from the field of battle, and Kellermann’s two divisions of cavalry “to establish themselves” partly there and partly at Liberchies, a village still further from the field: