(d) That he deliberately intended those three divisions of the 1st Corps and those two divisions of cavalry to stay at Frasnes and Liberchies, as his reserve, instead of having them with him for immediate use on the field of Quatre Bras: (e) Lastly, all these things are _admitted_ to be true; they are not accusations against him; they are facts, stated by himself, either in his own orders or letters, or by his own chief-of-staff, or by General Reille. 2. There is certainly one inference to be drawn from these facts. It is that Marshal Ney was not, in that night and morning, preparing for a decisive blow. So much, we presume, will be conceded. It is also plain that he was not proposing strictly to obey his orders. He evidently had his doubts about the wisdom of his orders. He was not going to embark too deep in what he evidently feared might prove a disastrous venture. He would proceed to Quatre Bras with the three divisions of the 2d Corps, but he would leave three divisions of the 1st Corps and the two divisions of Kellermann’s cavalry to protect his flank and line of retreat, and also to be at hand in case the Emperor should need them. He did not dare to trust the Emperor fully. He must, he felt, in this emergency, act according to his own judgment. 3. If we are right in this conclusion, we can easily understand why Ney failed to carry out the order given to him at five o’clock on the afternoon of the 15th, to seize Quatre Bras that evening. We have left the much disputed question of the giving of this order on one side in our narrative[287] for reasons already stated; but we have, nevertheless, expressed our opinion[288] that the order was given. Ney’s conduct on the 16th is of a piece, we believe, with his conduct on the 15th. 4. No serious criticism can be passed, we think, on the tenor of the orders issued to the corps-commanders of the left wing, or to the commander of that wing, during the afternoon of the 15th and the morning of the 16th. Neither the Emperor nor Soult could well have done more than they did to arouse the energy of the officers who had charge of the operations there.[289] The orders were precise and imperative. The trouble was that the officers to whom they were addressed lacked either the disposition or the energy requisite to carry them into effect. 5. But why, it may be fairly asked, did not Napoleon, as soon as he had found out that Ney had not seized Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th, order him forthwith to proceed to do so in the early morning of the 16th? Why this delay in sending him a formal written order? This question will be considered in the next chapter, when we come to describe Napoleon’s doings on the 16th. FOOTNOTES: [286] _Ante_, p. 51. [287] _Ante_, p. 52. [288] _Ante_, pp. 67, 68. [289] For an explanation of Chesney’s (pp. 118, 119) severe strictures, see _ante_, p. 51, n. 29. CHAPTER IX. THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH OF JUNE: NAPOLEON.