9. It is not easy to see why Napoleon, certainly when he found that he would have to fight a battle at Ligny, should not have ordered the 6th Corps up to Fleurus at once, so that he might have it close at hand in case he needed it. The extreme importance of inflicting, if possible, a crushing defeat on the Prussians was so clearly seen by him, as his orders to Ney on the afternoon of the 16th and morning of the 17th abundantly show, that we cannot understand why he should not have availed himself of the aid of Lobau’s command. Lobau, even if he were not sent for until 11 A.M., could have been at Fleurus at or before 4 P.M.; and had he then been directed to march in rear of the troops of Vandamme and Girard which were fighting at and near St. Amand, he could have fallen upon the Prussian right and rear near Brye at or about half-past five o’clock, which was the moment when Napoleon was preparing for the decisive stroke at Ligny. Lobau could undoubtedly have accomplished all that Napoleon expected from Ney. And the coöperation of Lobau could have been arranged for without any chance of failure, while that of Ney was necessarily dependent on the situation in which he might find himself at Quatre Bras. FOOTNOTES: [372] Clausewitz, ch. 25, p. 53. [373] _Cf._ Charras, vol. 1, pp. 182, 183. [374] Clausewitz, ch. 34. [375] Cons. sur l’Art de la Guerre, p. 339, cited in Corresp., vol. 31, p. 472. [376] Davout, p. 545. [377] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 472. [378] Clausewitz (ch. 34, pp. 81 _et seq._) points out that Ney’s coöperation could not have formed an essential part of Napoleon’s plan of battle, for Napoleon “could not know whether Ney would be able to spare him a single man.” [379] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 206. [380] Davout, p. 545. [381] Clausewitz, ch. 34, p. 83. [382] It is not quite clear in which direction this column was to advance. [383] Maurice, pp. 350, 351: July, 1890. Maurice thinks that the beaten troops must have crossed the turnpike, even if they were intending to retreat towards the Rhine. [384] Clausewitz, ch. 31, p. 66. [385] _Ante_, p. 133. [386] Clausewitz, ch. 31, p. 65. [387] Doc. Inéd., IX, p. 31; App. C, xxii; _post_, p. 381. [388] Charras, vol. 1, pp. 170, 171, 183, 184. [389] Jomini, p. 138. [390] Clausewitz, ch. 34, p. 84. [391] Clausewitz, ch. 32, pp. 73 _et seq._ [392] This includes the 6th Corps. [393] Charras makes the Prussian army about 87,000 strong. [394] Unless we include the IIId Corps among the Prussian reserves, the French superiority in reserves was very large; and Blücher, as Clausewitz goes on to state, did not have the IIId Corps at his disposal. [395] Davout, p. 547. CHAPTER XII. THE BATTLE OF QUATRE BRAS.